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Abstract
This thesis gives a summary of the empirical and theoretical literature on the re-
lation between income inequality and economic growth. The focus concentrates
on two approaches: the Political Economy approach and the Capital Market Im-
perfection approach. The diverging results of these approaches are then combined
to a single theory that tries to explain this complex relationship between growth
and inequality. This should lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms
that influence both, income inequality and economic growth and can help to draw
useful policy conclusions.
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5Part I. Introduction
The question how income inequality affects economic growth has always
been an important one - not only for society but also for politics. Income
inequality is usually not meant to be a good thing. Economists as well as so-
cial scientists have been debating on how income inequality effects economic
growth for more than two centuries.
Already the classical economists stated that income inequality fosters
growth in the post-industrialized state. Later, the neoclassical approach
suggested that inequality does not effect economic development but income
inequality is affected by the growth process. The modern perspective now
states that income inequality is an important force that influences the growth
process.
The modern perspective boosts discussions on how to react on rising
inequality. A nice example was made by the IMF recently (see Berg and
Ostry(2011)). Imagine that there are 1000 boats that represents the US and
the length of each boat represent income: While in the 1970s the average
boat was 3.7 meters and the longest 76.2 meters, in 2000 the average boat was
4.6 meters while the largest boat was 335.3 meter. As the authors mentioned:
“When a handful of yachts become ocean liners while the rest remain lowly
canoes, something is seriously amiss”. (Berg and Ostry(2011), IMF global
economic forum) The rich got much richer while the average worker had a
modest income growth. Such immense patterns of inequality did not occur
since the late 1920s and it obviously raises the question of redistribution.
On the other hand it also raises the question whether there is a link between
economic crises and income inequality. The Great Depression of the early
1930s and the Great Recession of the late 2000s might have been affected
by the high level of inequality. Since inequality affects the economic process
it will for sure influence such a crisis.
Whether redistribution from the rich to the poor has a positive or a
negative effect on economic growth is therefore an important question for
policy makers nowadays. Empirical studies differ widely in their results.
There is no clear empirical evidence that suggests that a simple relation
between income inequality and economic growth exists. The same is true
for economic theories. While some suggest a positive relation, most of them
show a negative one.
This thesis gives an overview on the relation of income inequality and
economic growth. It is arranged as follows: The main empirical findings are
summarized in the second part. The third part combines the main theories
on income inequality and economic growth and introduces some theoretical
models. The fourth part points out the policy implications of the theory
and the fifth part finally gives the major conclusions.
6Part II. Empirical Studies
The empirical studies on the relationship between income inequality and
economic growth are numerous. The results of this research are far away
from being unique. While older studies suggests a negative relation espe-
cially newer research shows a positive relation between income inequality
and economic growth.
The question of how to measure inequality is most important for empiri-
cal analysis. There are many different methods of measuring inequality and
there is no clear recommendation which measure to use. Most frequently the
Gini coefficient and the share of income are used but there are many other
measures that can be used. The following paragraph will summarize and
slightly explain these methods (for further informations see: Cowell(1995)):
• The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve which plots on the
y axes the cumulative income that is earned by the bottom x% of the
population. The 45°-line will therefore be total equality in society. The
Gini coefficient is the area between the 45°-line and the Lorenz curve
(A) compared to the area under total equality (A+B). Obviously a
Gini coefficient close to 0 will imply a equal income distribution while
a Gini coefficient close to 1 will imply unequal distribution of income.
Fig. 1: The Gini Coefficient
• TheHoover index states which fraction of the income has to be redis-
tributed to get total equality in society. Obviously a Hoover coefficient
close to zero indicates an equal society while an Hoover coefficient close
to 1 indicates high inequality in the income distribution.
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• The Theil index is a measure of entropy in a system and can not
only be used for inequality. It is derived by using the highest possible
entropy and subtract the entropy of the data. Maximum entropy oc-
curs when people can not be distinguished by their income, therefore a
Theil coefficient of 0 indicates perfect equality while 1 indicates perfect
inequality.
• The Atkinson index is based on the theoretical framework of the
Theil index but has an interesting feature. One can choose the level
of inequality aversion in order to make the coefficient more sensitive
to changes in different parts of the income distribution.
• The ratio of percentiles is also often used to measure inequality.
One can use for example the ratio between the median and the 10th
percentile to measure losses or gains of the lower income earners.
• The share of income is based on dividing the population in sub-
populations and see for what percentage of total income it accounts
for. The income share is usually used to show changes in the bottom-
end and top-end income distribution while e.g. the Gini coefficient
reflects the overall effect.
In recent papers (e. g. Voitchovsky(2005) or Foellmi and Oechslin(2008) )
the way of measuring income inequality by the Gini coefficient is criticized.
A splitting of the empirical part into 4 sections seems to be reason-
able. Section 1 presents the early literature and especially the findings of
Kuznets(1955,1963). Section 2 shortly summarizes the empirical research
based on cross-country data, while section 3 will introduce the main results
of panel-data based studies. Section 4 will then be a short summary and
will also give a critical view on the empirical research made so far.
1 Kuznets Model
Kuznets(1955) is one of the first papers that deals with the question of
whether inequality in the distribution of income increases or decreases eco-
nomic growth. It is not only an empirical study, Kuznets also came up with
a simple model that explains his empirical findings.
He used data from the US, UK and Germany (developed countries) and
India, Ceylon and Puerto Rico (developing countries). By comparing the
deciles of developed and underdeveloped countries, Kuznets(1955) found
two statistical patterns of the income distribution:
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1. Usually underdeveloped countries have no middle class, meaning that
most of the population lies far below the average income level while a
small group receives relative high incomes. Developed countries typi-
cally show a large group that receives income levels beyond the average
and a top group that possesses a low income share (compared to the top
group in the underdeveloped countries). This implies that inequality
is higher in underdeveloped than in more developed countries. Table
1 shows that in India, Ceylon and Puerto Rico income was distributed
more unequally compared to the US and the UK after World War II.
2. Annual income before taxes and without government transfers moves
from an unequal to a more equal distribution after the 1920s in devel-
oped countries. Table 1 shows that phenomenon for the US and the
UK.
Tab. 1: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS of Kuznets(1955) for developed and devel-
oping countries
United States 1.+2. quintile top quintile top 5%
1929 13.5% 55% 31%
φafter WWII 18% 44% 20%
United Kingdom lower 85% top 5%
1880 41% 46%
1913 43% 43%
1929 46% 33%
1938 - 31%
1947 55% 24%
post-WWII data lower 3 quintiles top quintile
India 28% 55%
Ceylon 30% 50%
Puerto Rico 24% 56%
United States 34% 44%
United Kingdom 36% 45%
The numbers in the tables show the income shares of the given group in the given country.
Recognizing that there is more inequality in the distribution of income
of developing countries led Kuznets(1955) to the following conclusions:
• Higher inequality in the income distribution is associated with lower
average income per capita. Saving in underdeveloped countries is more
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scarce than in developed. Only a really small group will be able to save.
This might explain the missing middle class in the income structure
in underdeveloped countries.
• In former times, underdeveloped countries started at the same levels
of GDP per capita as developed countries did. Therefore the unequal
income structure in developing countries goes along with a low rate of
growth in income per capita.
• The inequality in the distribution of income in underdeveloped coun-
tries did not scale down during the 1930’s and 1940’s. This is due to
the effect of accumulation of savings at the peak of the income dis-
tribution and the weak government-support for low income groups in
these countries.
According to Kuznets(1955) there are at least two forces that lead to in-
creasing inequality in the long-run:
• The concentration of savings in the higher income groups leads to
a concentration of income-producing assets in the hand of the top
quintile group. Therefore inequality should increase.
• The economic development influences the income distribution. The
population can be divided in a part that works in the industrial sector
and a part that works in the agricultural sector. In the growth process,
a country usually moves from an agricultural society to an industrial
one. The average income of the population in the agricultural sector
is usually lower than in the industrial sector. Additionally, inequality
is usually lower in the agricultural sector. During the growth process,
population shifts from agriculture to industry, meaning that the more
unequal distribution (in the industrial sector) gains weight. Addition-
ally the relative difference in income between the agricultural and the
industrial sector increases due to a faster increase in productivity in
the industrial sector. This overall means, inequality in the income
distribution should increase.
Thus the question arises, why empirically observed inequality declines and
especially why the income share of the lower income-group increases in devel-
oped countries ? What are the factors that counteract to the accumulation
of savings?
• First, when most of the population works in the industrial sector, the
inequality will decline because most of the people work now in the in-
dustry sector and the income gap between the sectors loses importance
in determining the inequality.
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• Second, as democracy develops in countries, the general view on rising
inequality might change at some level of inequality. Policy makers
might intervene to curb the capital concentration in the hand of a
small group by introducing taxes and capital levies.
• Third, in a more industrialized economy, the younger industry grows
faster than the old one, leading to a relative decrease in wealth of old
entrepreneurs. In this context, Kuznets(1955) states: “The success-
ful great entrepreneurs of today are rarely the sons of the great and
successful entrepreneurs of yesterday.”[23]
• Fourth, taking the high services income of a small group into account,
it can often be traced back to individual excellence. For the next gener-
ation, it will be hard to keep the level of service income. Additionally,
the main reason for income increase is the inter-industrial shift from
low-income to high-income industry. This is more limited for the high
income group than for the low income group.
These arguments do not indicate an overall effect on inequality - inequality
might be still increasing but it could also be decreasing. Kuznets(1955)
concludes: “One can say, that the basic factor militating against the rise in
upper-income shares that would be produced by the cumulative effects of
concentration of savings, is the dynamism of a growing and free economic
society” [23]
Inequality starts to widen at the beginning of the industrialization till
the industrialization stabilizes and a reduction of inequality occurs. This
phenomenon is known as the KUZNETS CURVE. Not only because it was
more a guesswork than an empirical study, the validity is still not clear.
Deininger and Squire(1998) showed that especially in underdeveloped coun-
tries the Kuznets relation can often not be found, while Barro(2000) stated
the Kuznets curve as an empirical regularity. Figure 2 shows the estimated
Kuznets curve of Barro(2000).
2 Cross-Country Studies 11
Fig. 2: Kuznets Curve of Barro(2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
The question, whether the development of European countries and the
US can be repeated in underdeveloped countries, was not answered by
Kuznets. It should be noted that the social and political background in
underdeveloped countries is and was entirely different from that in the Eu-
ropean countries and the US during the process of industrialization.
2 Cross-Country Studies
After Kuznets’s findings most studies focused on cross-section analysis due
to lack of data for panel analysis. Especially in the 1990’s a lot of research
was carried out. Most of it came to the same conclusion: Inequality harms
growth.
Persson and Tabellini(1994) performed a panel regression on historical
data from 1830 to 1985 and then a cross-country regression on post-war data
from 1960 to 1985.
For the historical data that includes nine countries (8 European and the
US), they split the sample in periods of 20 years to get panel data. A simple
growth model was estimated:
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GROWTHi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ INCSHi,t + β2 ∗NOFRANi,t (1)
+β3 ∗ SCHOOLi,t + β4 ∗GDPGAPi,t + i,t
GROWTH is the average growth rate of GDP per capita. INCSH is
the share in personal income of the top quintile of the population and is used
as a proxy for inequality. The higher INCSH, the greater the inequality of
the population. SCHOOL is a weighted average of the shares of relevant age
groups that are enrolled in different types of schooling. The higher the level
of schooling, the higher the given weight. GDPGAP is the ratio of GDP
per capita of the country and the highest GDP per capita in the sample and
is a proxy for the level of development of a country. NOFRAN is the ratio
of enfranchised age and sex groups and is based on the theoretical model
they introduced. The index i is a country index and t a period index.
Tab. 2: GROWTH REGRESSION (historical data) of Persson and Tabellini
(1994)
Source: Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? American
Economic Review 84 , pp. 600-621.
The striking result of the regression is that the coefficients of inequality
(INCSH) are always negative and significant in 3 of the 4 cases where
different models and samples are used. The coefficient of GDPGAP is
always significant and has a negative sign. That indicates a convergence to a
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certain GDP level over time. All the other coefficients are not significant and
do not yield to any interesting conclusion. After sensitivity testing, Persson
and Tabellini(1994) conclude that their results are robust. Reverse causation
can be ruled out but there is still the possibility of omitting variables.
For the post-war data which includes 56 countries, the regression model
is quite similar:
GROWTHi = β0+β1∗MIDDLEi+β2∗GDPi+β3∗PSCHOOLi+i (2)
i is the country index. The income share of the third(middle) quintile,
which includes the median, is used as a proxy for inequality and is denoted as
MIDDLE. That means, the greater equality, the greater the income share
of the middle quintile and therefore the expected sign is positive. Typical
control variables as initial GDP per capita and a human resource variable
PSCHOOL that measures the share of the relevant age group attending
primary school are added to the regression.
The results of the post-war data which are also split in democracies and
non-democracies are even more striking than the former results and are listed
in table 3.
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Tab. 3: GROWTH REGRESSION (post-war data) of Persson and Tabellini
(1994)
Source: Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? American
Economic Review 84 , pp. 600-621.
All of the coefficients have the expected sign and are in most cases sig-
nificant. The effects of a one standard deviation increase of equality, that is
an increase by 3.1 points in the variableMIDDLE, will increase the growth
rate by 0.58%. An interesting side result can be seen in column 2 and 3.
The effect of inequality and growth is negative and significant in democ-
racies, but the relation is positive for non democracies but not significant.
The different results for democracies and non-democracies is perfectly in
line with theory. It suggests that there is a negative relation in democracies.
But there might be no relation between income inequality and economic
growth in non-democracies simply because inequality is connected to eco-
nomic growth via the median voter theorem This can not be used in non
democratic regimes.
Another cross-country study has been done by Alesina and Rodrik(1994).
They based their argumentation on the theoretical fact that higher inequality
leads to more redistribution. That causes economic distortions and therefore
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reduces growth. The attempt is to measure the direct effect of inequality on
growth.
Their data is split into a low-quality sample that includes 70 countries
and a high quality sample that only includes 49 countries. Most of them are
OECD countries but also some developing countries are included. To solve
the problem of simultaneity, the time horizon is first chosen form 1960 to
1985 and then from 1970 to 1985. Additionally the two-stage least squares
method was used.
Typical control variables are included in the growth equation:
GROWTHi = β0 + β1 ∗GDP60i + β2 ∗ PRIM60i + β3 ∗Gini60i + i (3)
The initial GDP per capita is denoted as GDP60 and included for con-
vergence reasons and the primary school enrollment rate PRIM60 is used
as a proxy for the initial level of human capital.
Tab. 4: Growth regression of Alesina and Rodrik(1994)
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For the high quality sample the coefficients of GINI60 i.e. the Gini-
coefficient of 1960 is always significant on a 5% level and are always negative.
Therefore the regression suggests a negative link between economic growth
and inequality. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also added a Gini-coefficient
for land distribution(GINILND) to analyze the impact of other types of
inequality. For our purpose, this is not relevant.
Repeating the same procedure for the shorter time horizon (1970-1985)
leads to the results listed in table 5
Tab. 5: GROWTH REGRESSION of Alesina and Rodrik(1994)
Source: Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 , S. 465-490.
This adjustment of the data set improves the results. All coefficients on
GINI60 are now highly significant. The other results are in line in sign
with other studies(Persson and Tabellini, 1994) and the magnitude of the
coefficients is approximately the same as in table 4.
The empirical findings of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
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Tabellini (1994) - although based on a different theoretical reasoning - sup-
port a negative effect of inequality on growth. While Persson and Tabellini
(1994) argue that higher inequality leads to redistribution and therefore de-
creases incentives, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that higher inequality
leads to redistribution and therefore to market distortions. In any case, their
cross-country studies reveal that higher inequality tends to harm growth
opening a new discussion on the validity of the methods used.
3 Panel Data Studies
As shown in the previous section, most of the cross-country regressions result
in a negative relation between inequality and growth. But in the late 1990’s
new research was based on panel data. So the question arises: What is the
problem with cross-country estimations in general?
• It can be shown, that many of the coefficients in these studies are not
robust. This means that by adding variables, the coefficient becomes
insignificant.
• There are measurement errors in inequality and a bias due to omitted
variables.
• The interpretation of cross-country regressions is that countries with
lower inequality tend to grow faster in the long-run, but they do not
focus on how a change in inequality within a country changes this
country’s growth rate. This is the main focus of panel regression.
Measurement errors occur in cross-country data mainly because different
definition of key variables and because of inaccuracy in the data. Usually this
measurement error is quite high for inequality. Deininger and Squire(1996)
came up with a new data set on inequality, that tries to minimize this
measurement error. Data that
• were not from household surveys
• were not take from a representative sample and
• did not include wage, non-wage earnings and none monetary income
were excluded. The Deininger and Squire(1996) study was not only a break-
through because it uses high quality data, but also because it has a time-
series dimension for enough countries that allows to perform panel regression.
Deininger and Squire(1998) performed a cross-country regression on that
data set that brought again a negative relation between inequality and
growth. But when they added regional dummies to their growth regression,
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the results became highly insignificant. This is usually a sign of omitted
variables especially because the regional dummies are significant, meaning
that regional effects on growth are not captured by the model. The general
approach to reduce this bias is to use panel data because it controls for
country characteristics that are constant over time.
The main focus in this section will be on two papers of Forbes(2000) and
Barro(2000), both using panel data and the inequality data set of Deininger
and Squire(1996).
In the 1970’s, the Kuznets Curve was seen as an empirical regularity even
though it only explains little of the variance. Barro(2000) uses an extended
version of the neoclassical growth model for his empirical analysis to show
that this relationship has not weakened over time, as suggested by other
papers in the 1990’s.
In this neoclassical environment, the growth rate of per capita output
g is a function of the current level of per capita output y and the long-run
level of per capita output y∗.
g = f(y, y∗)
Assuming that y is given, an increase in y∗ increases g. This increase in
the long-run level can be caused by various reasons such as an enforcement
in property rights or an increase in political stability.
Using a sample from 1960 to 1995 for more than 100 countries, Barro
mentioned that it might be difficult to measure the variables in a consistent
way across countries over time since measurement errors in underdeveloped
countries are quite common. Also causality problems might arise since we
are looking at the effects of e.g. government policies on economic growth, but
in reality, the policies are often reactions to the economic environment. The
sample uses the average growth rates over three decades, 1965-1975, 1975-
1985 and 1985-1995 because some of the variables can not be determined in
years. The results of the general growth regression estimated with random
effects are shown in Table 6.
3 Panel Data Studies 19
Tab. 6: GROWTH REGRESSION of Barro(2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
The data shows a positive relation with the log of per capita GDP, the
rule-of-law index, the democracy index, the years of schooling, the invest-
ment ratio and with the growth rate of terms of trade. A negative relation
can be seen for the log of per capita GDP squared, government consump-
tion as a share of GDP, the democracy index squared, the inflation rate and
the log of the total fertility rate. We get different R² for each of the three
centuries.
The question arises, what measurement of inequality one should add to
the growth equation. Usually there are two different methods: either taking
the Gini-coefficient or using quintiles of the income distribution. Barro(2000)
concentrates on the Gini coefficient in his analysis. Since the data for in-
equality measures are rare some of the observations are lost.
Adding the Gini-coefficient to the growth regression in table 6 leads to
the results of table 7.
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Tab. 7: The effects of Gini on growth rates (Barro,2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
Column 1 shows that the parameter of Gini is close to 0. This implies
that there is a almost zero-relationship between inequality and growth as
shown in figure 4. However, if we exclude the fertility-rate which is usu-
ally correlated with inequality1 the coefficient of Gini becomes significantly
negative. A one standard-deviation increase in the Gini-coefficient would
decrease the growth rate by 0.4%. This magnitude is the same as in earlier
studies but it seems that it is only a proxy for the fertility rate.
1 Children are often seen as a retirement provision in the low income groups of de-
veloping countries. Therefore the high fertility rate in this group will enlarge the group
compared to the high income group and therefore leading to more inequality.
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Fig. 3: GROWTH VS. GINI (Barro, 2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
Even more interesting is the result in column two of Barro’s growth rate
regression. Adding an interaction term Gini∗ log(GDP ) yields to significant
results for both coefficients, individually and jointly. By simple calculations
we can now determine the critical GDP level that changes the impact of
inequality on growth.
γ = −0.328Gini+ 0.043Gini log(GDP )
∂γ
∂Gini
: −0.328 + 0.043 log(GDP ) = 0
⇒ GDP = e 0.3280.043 ≈ 2070$
Each level above 2070$ (of the year 1985) leads to a positive relation between
growth and income inequality cet. par.. The higher the GDP-level, the
higher the growth rate cet. par. since the coefficient of the cross-term is
positive. For levels below 2070$ the relation will be negative.
Dividing the sample as suggested by adding an interaction term, we get
two separate equations, one for countries with low GDP-levels (below 2070$)
and one for countries with high GDP-levels (above 2070$). The estimation
output is shown in column 3 in table 7. The result is basically the same as in
the equation with the interaction term. Figure 4 shows the this relationship
for low and high GDP per capita countries.
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Fig. 4: GROWTH VS. GINI divided sample (Barro, 2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
Going back to the empirical findings of Kuznets, one should see an in-
verted U-shaped relationship between inequality and the level of GDP per
capita. Using again the Gini coefficient as a measure for inequality and the
logarithm of the GDP per capita, we estimate the following equation:
Ginii,t = β1 ∗ log(GDPi,t) + β2 ∗ log(GDPi,t)2 + i,t (4)
where i is the country index and t is the time period and i,t the error
term.
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Tab. 8: DETERMINANTS OF INEQUALITY(random effects) (Barro,
2000)
Source: Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of
Economic Growth , pp. 5-32.
The results are striking. Both coefficients, the linear and the quadratic
one, are significant: the Gini coefficient increases up to a GDP-level of
1636$(of the year 1985) and starts to decrease afterwards. As we can see, the
explained variation is between 0.12 and 0.22 and therefore really small but
this is also in line with other research form recent years. Each R2 stands for
the explained variation in each of the four panel periods. From a theoretical
point of view, it makes sense that economic development alone only explains
a small fraction of the variation in inequality. Adding control variables as
shown in row 2, 3 and 4 of table 8 increases the fit of the regression, but
leaves the interesting coefficients almost unchanged.
Generally speaking, the overall data set shows no relation between in-
equality and growth. But there is evidence that inequality increases growth
in poor countries, while it decreases growth in richer ones. Besides the
Kuznets curve can be seen as a empirical regularity, even though it only
explains very little of the variance in inequality.
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Another research paper by Forbes(2000) chooses a growth model that is
often used in the literature:
Growthi,t = β1 ∗ inequalityi,t−1
+β2 ∗ incomei,t−1
+β3 ∗maleEducationi,t−1 (5)
+β4 ∗ femaleEducationi,t−1
+β5 ∗ PPPIi,t−1 + αi + δt + i,t
where i is the country index and t is the time period, αi are country
dummies and δt period dummies and i,t is the error term. The sample
ranges from 1966 to 1995 and is divided in six 5-year periods. Growth is the
average growth rate of real GNP per capita over the 5 years, inequality
is taken from the Deininger and Squire(1996) data set and is measured
by the Gini-coefficient, income is measured by the log of the real GNP
per capita, maleEducation and femaleEducation are average years of sec-
ondary schooling and PPPI represents the market distortions that are ap-
proximated by the price level of investment.
The usually used fixed effect or random effect technique is under assump-
tion of equation 5 not optimal because of the lagged income. Chamberlain’s
pi-matrix approach is also rejected by several test. Therefore the method
introduced by Arellano and Bond(1991) is used. It corrects for the bias in-
troduced by the lagged endogenous variable and permits a certain degree of
endogeneity in the other regressors.
3 Panel Data Studies 25
Tab. 9: REGRESSION RESULTS of Forbes(2000)
Source: Forbes, K. (2000). A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and
Growth. American Economic Review 90 , pp. 869-887.
In table 9 the results of all the different methods are listed. Forbes(2000)
shows that the coefficients estimated by the Arellano and Bond method are
consistent and efficient. All coefficients are highly significant and do not
differ from those found in other growth literature. The exception is the
coefficient of inequality. It turned out, that it is always significant and
positive, no matter which method is used. This contradicts to most of the
research done so far. Also the magnitude of the coefficient is surprisingly
high. A 0.1 increase in the Gini-coefficient will increase the average annual
growth rate by 1.3% over the next period.
This does not mean that previous research was totally wrong. One has
to distinguish the main interest of the cross-section studies and the Forbes
paper and how to interpret the results. While cross-section results analyze
the differences in the relation of inequality and growth across countries, the
coefficients estimated by Forbes(2000) have to be interpreted as how the
change in inequality effects the growth rate within each country across time.
This result does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that cross-country
regression analysis is wrong. The panel method measures basically a short-
run to medium-run relation of inequality and growth since a 5-year period is
used. Cross-country regressions are usually based on 25- to 30-year -average-
observations, meaning that they measures more the long-term relation be-
tween inequality and growth. Therefore it might be interesting to enlarge
the panels to ten years of observations. The long-run coefficient of the Gini-
coefficient of the panel regression stated in table 9 column 5 still shows the
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positive sign but becomes insignificant. The results can not be interpreted
easily since the data used is restricted due to low degrees of freedom. So to
get a better understanding of this long-run relation of inequality and growth
within a country, more data has to be available for a longer time.
An interesting result arises by testing the robustness of the coefficients.
In general the positive coefficients of Inequality seem to be strongly robust.
Dividing the data set into poor and rich countries, the relation between
inequality and growth stays positive in each of the groups. This is exactly
the opposite result, that Barro(2000) shows in his panel analysis. But there
might be a simple reason for the contradiction. Barro added poor countries
to his panel data while the Forbes analysis contains almost no very poor
developing countries, since the data for these countries are limited.
Forbes(2000) estimates models that are used in the literature and uses
different regression methods for the different model. The models show nega-
tive relation between inequality and growth when using cross-country analy-
sis but when using panel technique the results change to a positive relation.
However the result of Forbes(2000) are in general not a contradiction to
the findings of cross-country studies mentioned in section 2 since the results
of panel techniques seem to be not reliable as far as the long-run is concerned.
Also the findings of Barro(2000) are not rejected and point out the weakness
of the Forbes(2000) paper. The data used are not representative since very
poor countries are missing and this may bias the coefficients. On the other
hand, Barro(2000) uses low-quality inequality data of poor countries that
may also influence the results. But in general, the results for rich countries
are the same. Higher inequality increases the growth rate within a country
in the short-run. But both authors mentioned that the relation between
inequality and growth is still far from being solved. More research has to
be done in this field and also more data have to be collected especially for
developing countries.
4 Conclusion and Criticism
The analysis of the relation between income inequality and economic growth
seems to be an empirical mystery. Summarizing the empirical findings, the
literature that exploits the cross-section variation (as the random effects
method used in Barro(2000) and all the cross-sectional studies) suggests a
negative pattern, the panel-data approach that usually covers the time-series
variation yields a positive relation. This subsection will first present a paper
of Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller(2010) that tries to answer the variety of
empirical results. The second part can then be seen as a criticism of the
methods used in the analysis and additionally it points out new possible
fields for research.
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4.1 Concluding remarks
How can we explain these distinct results in the cross section analysis and the
panel analysis? Forbes(2000) pointed already out that the two approaches
usually have a different meaning. While the cross section studies focus on
long-run growth, the approach focusing on time-series takes a closer look
on the short and medium-run. This argument is carried out in a paper of
Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller(2010). It provides a strong thought for the
distinct results of the empirical analysis:
What explains positive short-run effects of inequality on growth? Kuznets
(1955) already argued with the accumulation of savings, as we saw in chap-
ter 1. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) state that under the assumption
of weak capital markets the realization of money-demanding projects can
only be implemented under the condition of high inequality. The long-run
negative effect of inequality and growth is theoretically driven by social and
political actions and frameworks. Benabou (1996) argues that the higher in-
equality leads to higher political instability and therefore decreases growth.
Perotti (1993) attributes the negative relation to expensive fiscal policy.
Galor and Zeira (1993) trace it back to the reduction of human capital for-
mation. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that inequality harms growth by
leading to higher redistribution and therefore distort markets. As we can see
already, the theoretical negative effects of income inequality on growth are
closely linked to the institutional and political framework. Usually political
and institutional changes take a lot of time and therefore are only valid for
the long-run while the positive effects are already present in the short-run,
since they are part of economic mechanisms. If these positive short-run ef-
fects dominate the negative long-run effects, the overall long-run effect on
the growth rate can be positive. But obviously it can also be negative if
they do not.
For the empirical analysis Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller (2010) use the
same model as Forbes (2000) (equation (5)) and the same method using first-
difference GMM. The data is also quite similar, but the range is now from
1966-2005 and some countries are added. In addition, they use the system
GMM to subtract long-run implications. The results of the first difference
GMM(that extracts the overall short-term pattern) shown in table 10 are in
line with the results presented by Forbes (2000) - in sign and approximately
in magnitude.
Using the system GMM(that extracts only the long-term pattern) shown
in table 11, the results are not that obvious.
The regression on the full sample leads to an insignificant negative co-
efficient of the Gini-coefficient. Splitting the sample in high income, high
middle income and low-middle and low-income countries leads to a signifi-
cant result in two of them. Lower inequality leads to lower growth in high
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Tab. 10: GROWTH REGRESSION(first-difference GMM) of Halter, Oech-
slin and Zweimüller(2010)
Source: Halter, D., Oechselin, M., & Zweimüller, J. (2010). Inequality and Growth: The
Neglected Time Dimension. Working Paper Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich .
income countries while the adverse relation appears in the low-middle and
low income group. This is perfectly in line with Barro(2000), Persson and
Tabellini(1994) and Rodrik and Alesina(1994). For countries that are not
among the richest, the long-term effect of higher inequality on growth is
negative.
4.2 Criticism
The empirical analysis pointed out so far should not be seen as exactly
brilliant. Criticism of the research done so far was stated in a paper from
Voitchovsky(2005). While former research was always based on a single
inequality statistic, the paper suggests to use more than one inequality mea-
sures for a simple reason: From the theoretical point of view, the positive and
negative effects of inequality on economic growth can not only be divided in
long-run and short-run effects but can also be split by the distribution itself.
While inequality at the top end of the income distribution is positively linked
to growth, higher inequality at the bottom end of the income distribution
will theoretically lead to a decrease of growth. Using the Gini-coefficient as
a source of inequality only takes the average of these effects into account.
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Tab. 11: GROWTH REGRESSION(system GMM) of Halter, Oechslin and
Zweimüller(2010)
Source: Halter, D., Oechselin, M., & Zweimüller, J. (2010). Inequality and Growth: The
Neglected Time Dimension. Working Paper Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich .
Using again the arguments of an marginal saving rate that increases with
the level of income(Kuznets, 1955 and others), the positive effect concerning
the inequality at the top end distribution seems reasonable. Higher poverty
reflected by higher income inequality at the bottom end distribution usually
increases anti-social behavior, increases risk and therefore reduces growth.
Higher overall inequality usually leads to instability and therefore to lower
growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). The effect of taxes is uncertain. While
increased taxation has a negative effect on people at the top end distribution,
the effect on people at the bottom end distribution is positive because pro-
ductivity increases by relaxing the credit constraints(Benabou, 1996). Gen-
erally speaking, most positive effects can be associated with the inequality
in the top end while most negative effects can be linked to the inequality in
the bottom end distribution.
Voitchovsky(2005) uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
The inequality is measured by the ratio of income percentiles, e. g. the
top end ratio as 90/75 and the bottom end as 50/10. Data is available for
21 countries from 1975 till 2000. The used sample contains only wealthy
democratic countries and it has to be mentioned that it is by far smaller
than most of the samples used in other research. It can be already seen in
the data that it is possible that the Gini coefficient stays constant over time
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while the top and bottom end inequality changes noticeably(e. g. the UK
in the 1970’s).
The model conforms to other research by using the same 5 year structure
in the model (as Forbes, 2000). Facing also the same difficulties, the best
estimation technique suggested is the system GMM. The results are stated
in table 12:
Tab. 12: GROWTH REGRESSION of Voitchovsky(2005)
Source: Voitchovsky, S. (2005). Does the Profile of Income Inequality Matter for Eco-
nomic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth , pp. 273-296.
Using only one of the measures of inequality (e. g. Gini coefficient, the
90/75 - ratio or the 50/10 ratio) leads to a insignificant negative coefficient
for the Gini-coefficient and the bottom end ratio and to an insignificant
positive coefficient for the top end ratio. But adding two of them (the Gini-
coefficient and the top end ratio) to the growth regression leads to a highly
significant result. Testing for joint significance (Wald-test) suggests that
both are jointly significant. The economic interpretation of our coefficients
is now the following: Once controlling for the top end inequality, the Gini-
coefficient represents the inequality in the bottom end of the distribution.
The effect of inequality in the top end of the distribution is positive, while
the effect is adverse in the bottom end of the distribution. Sensitivity testing
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(e. g. using different models, including dummies and so on) points out that
the signs of the coefficients are robust.
The paper of Voitchovsky(2005) points out the limitation of using a single
inequality statistic. The important question is whether the average effect
of inequality on growth is interesting or whether the more complex relation
within the income distribution is of interest. The overall effect on growth
can not be determined in this model, since the magnitude of the coefficients
vary with changing control variables and sample size. In order to be able
to draw more conclusions about the relation between income inequality and
economic growth, one needs to make further investigation. Additionally,
better and bigger data sets would ease the problems faced so far.
Table 13 summarizes the main results of the empirical studies discussed
so far. These results led to various theoretical models. Most of the models
discussed in the next can explain parts of these empirical results. One should
keep in mind that this research should not be seen as an explanation for the
relationship between income inequality and economic growth in general but
it points out that there is a relationship that might be different in the short
run and the long run. Additionally, this relation also depends on how we
define income inequality and how we measure it.
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Tab. 13: Different studies on the relation of inequality and growth
Method
Overall
result
rich
coun-
tries
poor
coun-
tries
Remark
Persson and
Tabellini
(1994)
OLS - n. a. n. a.
democracies vs.
non-democracies
Alesina and
Rodrik
(1994)
OLS - n. a. n. a.
Gini for land
distribution
Barro
(2000)
R. E. 0 + - low-quality data
Forbes
(2000)
GMM + + +
almost no
developing
countries
CONCLUSION
Halter,
Oechslin and
Zweimüller
(2010)
GMM
- in l.r.
+ in
s.r.
+ in l.r.
+ in s.r.
- in l.r.
+ in s.r.
long-run(l.r.) and
short-run(s.r.)
differences
CRITICISM
Voitchovsky
(2005)
GMM (-) n. a. n. a.
distinct inequality
measures
( ) stands for insignificant results
n.a. stands for not applicable
0 stands for a zero relation
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Part III. Theory
In general there are two approaches that try to explain the relation between
inequality and growth:
• the political economy approach and
• the capital markets imperfections approach
While the first one is based on the political system that under higher in-
equality will produce market distortions and therefore decreases incentives
for the upper part of the income distribution, the second approach usually
leads to underinvestment in capital. The results of both theories are usually
in line. They suggest that higher inequality harms growth. For each of the
two approaches, a model will be presented in detail later in this chapter. But
there are some exceptions that suggest that the relation between inequality
and growth is ambiguous or even negative.
The main goal of this part is to give a brief overview over the recent
literature and models that are used to explain the relation between inequality
and growth. The division of the two groups mentioned before seems to be
reasonable. Therefore section 5 will introduce some of the political economy
models, while section 6 briefly presents some of the models that are based on
capital market imperfections. Additionally, chapter 7 will introduce other
models that are not directly linked to one of the two approaches.
5 The Political Economy Models
5.1 Introduction
The political economy models are, as the name suggests, based on the po-
litical system. Income inequality has always an impact on the political
decisions. Politicians tend to implement policies that are most popular. An
often used argument in these models is the median voter theorem2. This
subsection will give a brief overview over the most cited models in the po-
litical economy approach. Subsection 2 will then show the model of Alesina
and Rodrick(1994) in detail. The model of Li and Zou(1998) is based on
the model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994) but leads under some distinct as-
sumption to the opposite result. Subsection 4 will than summarize the main
findings of the political economy approach.
2 The median voter theorem goes back to Black(1948) and states that the vote-
maximizing strategy for a politician is to choose the preferred policy of the median voter.
(assuming that there are two politicians and individuals choose the policy that is closest
to their individually preferred preference)
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Alesina and Rodrik(1994) developed a endogenous growth model in which
individuals are endowed with different capital/labor shares. They include
a government service in the production function that is necessary for pro-
duction. It can be seen as the institutional framework for production. This
government service is financed by a tax on capital. Under these assump-
tions, they show that individuals almost always prefer a higher tax rate
to the growth maximizing tax rate (only pure capitalists would choose ex-
actly the growth maximizing tax rate). Additionally they point out that the
higher the relative factor endowments of the median voter (that can be used
as a proxy for inequality), the higher will be the preferred tax rate. Applying
the median voter theorem this tax rate will be chosen by the politicians. A
higher tax rate will decrease incentives to invest and therefore results in a
negative effect of inequality on economic growth.
Li and Zou(1998) used the model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994) and showed
that under the assumption that the public service will not be used for pro-
duction but for consumption services, the outcome of the model is the reverse
one. But the authors mentioned that in real world, government uses pub-
lic services for both, production and consumption services. Therefore the
relation of inequality and growth is ambiguous.
Persson and Tabellini(1994) invented also a political economy model
based on an overlapping generation model that leads to the same result
as the model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994). They use model where income
is taxed only for redistributive reasons (not to provide a public good that is
necessary for private production). The main result is that inequality harms
growth because it leads to policies that do not allow individuals to take the
whole advantage from investment. And also the empirical findings of the
two papers (as shown in section 2) are the same.
5.2 Model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994)
The political economy approach is based on the idea that economic growth is
forced by the accumulation of capital. The incentives to accumulate individ-
ually are obviously closely linked to the individual benefit. In a society with
a high inequality redistributive policies are more likely. But these policies
automatically lower incentives to accumulate and therefore reduce growth.
5.2.1 The Model
The main idea of this section is to develop a model that shows how the
political process can effect the long-run growth. The simplified model is
taken from Alesina and Rodrik(1994).
It is a endogenous growth model and based on two factors:
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• aggregated labor endowment l which is not accumulated
• aggregated capital endowment k that accumulates and includes all
types of capital: physical capital, human capital and proprietary tech-
nology
Growth is obtained by the expansion of the capital stock k which is indeed
a result of individual saving.
The aggregated production function is assumed to be the following:
y = Akαg1−αl1−α 0 < α < 1 (6)
A is a technological factor. There is a tax on capital income τ that is used
for government services g. Private production requires thhese government
services. It can be seen as the framework for economic actions. Assuming
that the government budget is balanced we get:
g = τk (7)
We can see that the tax is linear in the capital stock. It is not a pro-
gressive tax on capital. But assuming that wage income is relatively even
distributed compared to capital the tax can be seen as a progressive tax.
And therefore there is an incentive for capital poor voters to vote for a
higher tax on capital.
Assuming perfect competition and the aggregated labor supply perfect
inelastic (l = 1) yields to the usual FOC by differentiating (6) with respect
to k and l and substituting (7):
r = αAτ 1−α (8)
w = (1− α)Aτ 1−αk (9)
The marginal productivity of capital (r) is independent of the aggregated
capital stock k. Both marginal productivities w and r are increasing in the
tax rate since a higher tax-rate increases g for a given k. And the wage rate
(w) is also increasing in the capital stock k.
The after-tax wage and capital income yl and yk are as follows:
yk = (r − τ)k (10)
yl = wl = w since l = 1 (11)
The role of the tax-rate in the model can be seen best in equation (10)
and (11):
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• First, the tax has an influence on the capital income yk. On the one
hand, the tax rate τ is positively linked to r as mentioned in equation
(8). On the other hand it directly effects the net income of capital in a
negative way. So obviously the overall effect is not clear but it is clear
that it effects the accumulation of capital.
• Second, the higher the tax rate the higher the wage income yl since
the tax rate is positively linked to w as shown in equation (9). A
higher tax-rate leads to an higher spending in public services g which
increases productivity.
The relative factor endowment of individuals is assumed to be different.
Each individual i is indexed by its relative factor endowment σi:
σi =
li
ki
k
(12)
meaning that an individual with low relative factor endowment is capital
rich and vica versa. The individual net income yi is given by the individual
labor and capital stock:
yi = wli + (r − τ)ki = ησiki + (r − τ)ki (13)
where η = (1− α)Aτ 1−α
as we know that σi ∗ki = k ∗ li from equation (12) . Note that the individual
income is not only affected by the individual capital stock ki but also by the
aggregated capital stock k which is included in the wage rate w.
Assuming a logarithmic utility function, the consumption-saving decision
can be stated as follows:
max
´∞
0
log ci ∗ e−ρtdt
(14)
s.t. dk
i
dt
= yi − ci = ησiki + (r − τ)ki − ci
meaning that an individual maximizes its overall discounted utility (discount
rate ρ) taking into account the change of the capital stock over time which
is the difference of the individual income and what the individual consumes.
The solution of this problem is:
dci
dt
ci
= (r − τ)− ρ (15)
Calculations are shown in the Appendix in section A.
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Assuming now that the tax rate is constant over time, individuals will
accumulate along the steady-state path:
dci
dt
ci
=
dki
dt
ki
= (r − τ)− ρ ≡ γ(τ) (16)
meaning that there is a constant economy wide growth rate γ(τ), since indi-
viduals accumulate at the same rate. Individual factor endowment does not
enter the solution. This also implicates that the relative factor endowments
stay constant over time and therefore the wealth and income distribution is
constant over time. The growth rate is a linear function of the difference of
the after tax return on capital (r− τ) and the discount factor ρ. This result
obviously eases the voting process since the median voter would change over
time, meaning that also strategic voting hast to be taken into account.
Note that the overall effect of the capital tax on the solution is not linear.
For high tax rates, the direct negative effect of the capital tax dominates
the positive productivity enhancing effect (r depends positively on τ). For
lower tax rates, the opposite is true. The relation between growth and the
tax rate is an inverse U-shaped as can be seen in figure 5.
Fig. 5: The relation between growth rate and tax rate
The question arises, at which tax-rate τ ∗ the growth rate is maximized.
Rewriting equation (16) and maximizing it leads to the following result:
τ ∗ = [(1− α)αA]1/α (17)
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Calculation can be seen in the Appendix in section A. The growth maximiz-
ing tax rate only depends on the technological factor A and does not depend
on time.
It might be interesting to look at the preferred taxation of individual i.
Therefore we look at the maximization problem of the government that is
only concerned about individual i. The problem looks as follows:
max
´
log ci ∗ e−ρtdt
s.t.
dki
ki
dt
= γ(τ) = r − τ − ρ
(18)
dk
k
dt
= γ(τ) = r − τ − ρ
ci = [ησi + ρ] ki
where the last constraint is derived from equation (14) and (16). The calcu-
lations are shown in the Appendix in section A. This yields to the following
result:
τ i
[
1− αA(1− α)(τ i)−α] = ρ(1− α) η(τ i)σi
η(τ i)σi + ρ
(19)
η(τ i)∗σi
η(τ i)∗σi+ρ = θ
i is the share of labor income component in consumption expen-
ditures of individual i. The calculations are shown in Appendix in section
A. Time does not enter the expression of the best individual tax rate τ i.
Therefore τ i is constant over time and depends positively on the relative
factor endowment of individual i. One can show that the lower the relative
factor endowment σi (the capital-richer the individual i), the lower the opti-
mal individual tax rate τ i. A pure capitalist (no labor income and therefore
σk = 0) yields to an interesting result: τ ∗ = τ k = [(1− α) ∗ α ∗ A]1/α
This implies that the tax rate that maximizes growth τ ∗ is the same as
the pure capitalist would prefer. On a first glance, it might be surprising
that the pure capitalist prefers some capital tax level to no taxes. But given
the model assumptions that public service is needed for production the result
becomes clear. Being endowed with only a small amount of wage income
directly implicates that the individual would prefer a tax rate higher than
the growth maximizing tax rate.
Assuming that wealth is evenly distributed among all individuals mean-
ing that σi = 1 a government chooses a tax rate that is higher than the
growth maximizing tax rate τ ∗.
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Recalling the equation of individual consumption ci = [ησi + ρ] ki one
can see that the consumption of a capitalist is ci = ρ ∗ ki and therefore
independent of the tax rate. For all the other individuals the tax rate has
also an effect on consumption by changing the wage income (see equation
11 and 9). A tax rate greater than τ ∗
• increases the level of consumption and
• decreases the rate of growth of aggregated incomes and consumption
Assuming the tax rate to be at the growth maximizing level τ ∗, a small
increase will lead to a higher consumption level of all individuals except the
pure capitalist and will decrease the growth rate of income and consumption
slightly. The net effect will be beneficial for all except the pure capitalist.
Applying the median voter theorem in our model is valid. The prefer-
ences over a single issue(the tax rate) are single peaked and the relation
between the ideal tax rate and the individual relative factor endowment is
monotonic as we showed before. Therefore the chosen policy only depends
on the preferred tax rate of the medium voter. This again depends on the
relative factor endowment of the median voter. Since this tax rate is inde-
pendent of time (as we have shown in equation 19) and the distribution of
factor endowments do not change over time, it does not matter whether the
voting takes place only at the beginning or in each period.
In a perfectly equal economy, the relative factor endowment of individuals
is σi = 1 and therefore the relative income share of the median voter is
σm = 1 the same. In real world σm > 1 meaning that the median voter
is above the average share. Using this findings, we can use σm − 1 - the
difference between the share of the median voter and the share of the average
voter - as a measure of inequality. The higher σm − 1, the further away is
the share of the median voter from the share of the average voter meaning
that 50% of the population owns a very low share of the capital stock and
therefore inequality is higher. This means the higher the relative income
share of the median voter, the higher the inequality.
Since we are interested in income inequality, we have to rearrange equa-
tion (13) as follows:
yi = ηlik + (r − τ)kl
i
σi
=
[
η +
(r − τ)
σi
]
kli
Assuming that labor is unskilled, meaning that li is almost the same for all
individuals, would imply an adverse relation of the income share σi and the
individual income. The higher our gap of inequality in capital endowment,
the larger will also be the gap between the average and the median income.
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5.2.2 Summary
It is possible to summarize the model in 4 points that basically explain
the model and the mechanisms that lead to the negative relation between
inequality and economic growth:
• Firstly, the model points out that the preferred tax rate of all individ-
uals is at least as high as the growth-maximizing tax rate (it would be
the same only for a pure capitalists);
• secondly, the higher the relative factor endowment of the median voter,
the higher will be the preferred tax rate of the median voter;
• thirdly, using the median voter theorem, the preferred tax rate of the
median voter will be chosen by the government and
• fourthly, this implies that the higher the inequality, the higher the
factor endowment of the median voter. The chosen tax rate will be
therefore higher as well and therefore lowers the growth rate.
This leads to the overall result that the higher the inequality in wealth and
also in income, the lower the growth rate.
Using the median voter theorem leads to interesting side result. Ob-
viously the model seems to be more reliable for democracies than for dic-
tatorships, since the voting process is only part of the political system of
democracies. But still, even in a dictatorship the policy is based on social
pressure. It also depends on the nature of the regime whether it prefers
redistribution or tries to maximize growth.
5.2.3 Criticism
Several assumptions of the Alesina/Rodrik model might not reflect the whole
story.For example, the inequality measure may be not adequate. There
exist distributions where the difference between the median and the average
voter is the same while inequality measured by e. g. the Gini-coefficient is
totally different. Overall it might be a convenient and easy way to measure
inequality but for the interpretation of the result one should take that into
account.
The growth maximizing tax rate can not be achieved in practice since it
would require the median voter to have no labor income at all. This is in
real world not possible.
The assumption that labor is supplied perfectly inelastically is also a
limiting one. In reality, the labor supply will not be totally unresponsive to
changes of the real wage.
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The tax regime used in the model is also not realistic. A tax on con-
sumption and a tax on labor income may have different effects.
Assuming that government spending only effects production was criti-
cized by Li and Zou(1998). They argue that government spending can be
divided into production services and consumption services. Adding govern-
ment spending to the individual consumption-saving decision the outcome is
the inverse one, showing that inequality can also foster growth. The model
specification will be shown in the next section.
5.3 The model of Li and Zou (1998)
The model of Li and Zou(1998) is based on the model of Alesina and Ro-
drik(1994) but the underlying framework is more general. Public spending
can be divided in production services and consumption services. This model
will focus on the consumption side of the government spending.
5.3.1 The Model
The individual utility-function U i of the model is assumed to have the form
of the CES-utility function and includes individual consumption ci as well
as public spending g:
U i =
ˆ ∞
0
[
(ci)
1−θ − 1
1− θ + ln g
]
e−ρtdt (20)
The production function is the same as in the model of Alesina and
Rodrik(1994) (assuming that α = 1):
y = Akαg1−α = Ak (21)
where k is the aggregated capital stock and A is a technological parameter.
The price of capital is r = dy
dk
= A. A positive tax rate on capital τ leads
to an after-tax income of the individual yi = (1 − τ)Aki. The net return
is therefore r(1 − τ) = A(1 − τ). The government spending (assuming a
balanced budget in each period) will be:
g = τAk (22)
Individual capital accumulation is given by the difference of individual in-
come and the individual consumption. Therefore dki
dt
= yi − ci = (1 − τ) ∗
A ∗ ki − ci
The individual income share is:
φi =
Aki
Ak
=
ki
k
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which is also individual i’s wealth (capital) share. Obviously individual with
high φi is capital rich and therefore also income rich. Note that this definition
is different to the definition in the model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994)!
The individuals maximization problem is therefore:
max U i =
´∞
0
[
(ci)
1−θ−1
1−θ + ln g
]
e−ρtdt
s. t. dk
i
dt
= yi − ci = (1− τ)Aki − ci
The solution to this problem is shown in the Appendix in Part C and
yields again to a growth rate that is the same for capital, income and con-
sumption:
dci
dt
ci
=
dki
dt
ki
=
dyi
dt
yi
=
(1− τ)A− ρ
θ
≡ γ(τ) (23)
Since the growth rate is independent of any individual characteristics
and not dependent on time, we can assume that the income shares do not
change over time.
Again the maximization problem for a government that is only concerned
about one individual (the median voter) is of interest. It can be stated as
follows:
max U i =
´∞
0
[
(ci)
1−θ−1
1−θ + ln g
]
e−ρtdt
s. t.
dki
dt
ki
= (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
dk
dt
k
= (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
dki
dt
= yi − ci = (1− τ)Aki − ci
The calculations for this maximization problem are shown in the Appendix
in section C. It leads to the following FOC:
− A (σik0)1−θ (ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−1
+
1
τ iρ
− A
θρ2
= 0 (24)
Assuming that the discounted utility has to be bounded,
(
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)
>
0.
Taking the total differential will lead us to (for calculations see Appendix
Part C):[
1− θ2
θ
A2
(
σik0
)1−θ (ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
]
dτ i + (25)[
−A (σik0)−θ (ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−1
1− θ
θ
k0
]
dσi = 0 (26)
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Looking at the first part of the left side:[
1−θ2
θ
A2 (σik0)
1−θ (ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
]
dτ i =[
A (σik0)
−θ (ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)−θ−1
1−θ
θ
k0
]
dσi
LHS: The first term is only negative if θ > 1 and positive if θ < 1 while
the second term is always negative.
RHS: This is only positive if θ < 1 and negative if θ > 1.
So we can conclude that:
• dτ i
dσi
> 0 if θ > 1 because:
(A) dτ i = (B) dσi
dτ i
dσi
=
B
A
And since A and B are negative:
dτ i
dσi
> 0
• dτ i
dσi
= 0 if θ = 1 because:
−
[
1
(τ i)2ρ
]
dτ i = [0] dσi = 0
dτ i = 0
⇒ dτ
i
dσi
= 0
Empirically the θ is usually not smaller than one and therefore one can
conclude that the individual tax rate is monotonically increasing with the
income share. This stays in contrast to the findings of Alesina and Ro-
drik(1994). The new role of the government overcompensates now the neg-
ative effect of capital income taxation. If we assume a θ that is smaller
than one, the first term of the lhs in equation (25) will be positive while
the second is negative. The rhs of equation (25) will have a negative sign.
Therefore the sign for dτ i
dσi
can either be positive or negative.
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Again using the median-voter theorem as Alesina and Rodrik(1994) the
chosen tax rate will be the tax-rate that is preferred by the median voter:
−A (σmk0)1−θ
(
ρ− (1− τm)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−1
+
1
τmρ
− A
θρ
= 0
If the income is distributed more equally in the economy, the income
share of the median voter will be higher and therefore the tax rate is higher
but the growth rate will be lower (see equation (23) ).
Intuitively, the individuals try to equalize the marginal utility of private
and public consumption.
5.3.2 Summary
By using the median voter theorem and assuming that public spending enters
the utility function directly, Li and Zou(1998) show that if income is dis-
tributed more equally, the preferred tax rate of the median voter is higher
meaning that the growth rate will be reduced. As a general result they
mentioned that their assumptions as well as the assumptions of Alesina and
Rodrik(1994) are not realistic, but the reality should be somewhere in the
middle. Therefore, the result of a growth regression should lead to am-
biguous results, depending on the focus of the government (consumption or
production).
5.4 Concluding Remarks
The “traditional” political economy approach suggests a negative relation
between income inequality and economic growth: The models of Alesina and
Rodrick(1994) and Persson and Tabellini(1994) are the most cited papers
not only because they also found empirical evidence for their theory. Later,
Li and Zou(1998) showed, that under different assumptions, the model of
Alesina and Rodrick(1994) can lead to exactly the opposite result, leading
to a discussion about the validity of the political economy approach.
The model of Li and Zou(1998) is based on the assumption that gov-
ernment spending is used for public consumption only, while the model of
Alesina and Rodrik(1994) assumes that government spending is used for pro-
duction only. Both assumptions are not realistic since in real world it is used
for both. So in general the relation between inequality and growth should
be ambiguous. Li and Zou(1998) argue that this should lead to insignificant
results in growth regressions.
Additionally, one has to mention that this approach is based on a demo-
cratic economy, meaning that the models can not be used for countries with
an authoritarian regime.
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6 The Capital Market Imperfection Models
6.1 Introduction
All possible relations between inequality and economic growth can be shown
in a model based on capital market imperfections. While some suggest a
negative relation3 others argue that the relation is ambiguous4. An argument
for a positive relation between inequality and economic growth is introduced
by Foellmi and Oechslin(2008). This subsection will give a brief overview
over these models, while the second subsection will introduce the model of
Galor and Zeira(1993). Subsection 3 will then summarize the main findings
of the capital market imperfection approach..
Aghion and Bolton(1997) came up with a so called “trickle-Down” model
that is based on the idea that the capital accumulation of rich people may
trickle down to the poor. The mechanism can be found on the capital market.
The more capital will be accumulated, the more funds will be available for
investment which helps poor individuals to become rich. The interest rate is
modeled endogenously by the market of investment funds. The authors show
that assuming a fast accumulation of capital, the equilibrium interest rate
converges to a fixed level. The interesting question in this case is whether
this trickle-down effect that works in favor of equality in wealth distribution
is strong enough to cancel out the capital accumulation effect that works in
favor of the inequality of wealth distribution. The relation of inequality and
economic growth is therefore supposed to be ambiguous in this model.
Galor and Zeira(1993) based their model on imperfect capital markets
and the assumption that the interest rate for borrowers is higher than the
interest rate for lenders. Therefore the distribution of wealth determines
the economic activity. Investment in human capital(indivisible) is therefore
only possible for individuals that inherit enough wealth. This leads to an
underinvestment in human capital and therefore harms growth not only in
the short-run but also in the long-run (due to inter-generational transfers).
As a result, the authors mention that a large middle class is important to
ensure high economic growth. The model is also robust when determining
the wage endogenously. The model will be presented in section 6.
A similar argument is used by Banjeree and Newman(1993). Instead of
choosing between working in the skilled or unskilled sector as in the model
of Galor and Zeira(1993), individuals have to choose between becoming a
worker or an entrepreneur. The authors argue that under the assumption
of imperfect credit markets and fixed costs for entrepreneurial activities in-
equality will lead to an underinvestment in this entrepreneurial activity and
3 see Galor and Zeira(1993) and Banjeree and Newman(1993)
4 see Aghion and Bolton(1997)
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therefore harms growth.
As seen before, a lot of literature based on the credit market imperfection
as the channel through which inequality effects output suggested a negative
relation between growth and inequality. The usual argument is that because
of credit market imperfections, investment depends on individual wealth and
therefore leads to inefficiency because marginal returns do not necessarily
equalize. In contrast, Foellmi and Oechslin(2008) came up with a model that
shows the adverse result. If inequality is decreased by redistribution from the
rich to the middle-class the demand for capital will increase (assuming that
the investment function is an increasing but concave function in the initial
endowment) and therefore the interest rate goes up. This obviously hurts
the poor because they are more dependent on borrowing when they want to
invest. Investment of the poor will decrease and since they face the highest
marginal returns, this effects growth in a negative way. If this indirect effect
is higher than the direct growth-enhancing effect of the redistribution, the
overall effect will be negative. This is also in accordance with Galor and
Zeira(1993)5. This is not only a new way of looking on the relation of
inequality and growth, it also questions whether the Gini-coefficient as a
measure for inequality in empirical analysis will enter the growth regression
positively or negatively. This would also explain the big variety in empirical
results of growth regressions as we saw in Part II. The authors suggest
for further research to use quantile shares instead of the Gini-coefficient to
measure inequality. This allows inequality coming from various parts of the
distribution to have different impact on economic growth. This is perfectly
in line with the suggestions and empirical findings of Voitchovsky(2005) 6
6.2 The Model of Galor and Zeira (1993)
The credit market imperfection approach is based on the fact that people
might not be able to invest in human capital and therefore loose the op-
portunity to earn high rates of return. Therefore it might be beneficial for
the economy to redistribute from rich to poor since it increases the average
productivity of investment and therefore increases growth at least in the
short-run. This short run implication is shown in many papers but the long
run implication was first introduced in a model of Galor and Zeira(1993)that
will be discussed in detail in this subsection.
5 They show that under the assumption that the production function is not globally
concave, the effect of inequality on output is ambiguous.
6 “The results in this study suggest that growth is facilitated by an income distribution
that is compressed in the lower part of the distribution, but not so at the top end. In
this view, redistributive policies — such as progressive taxation and social welfare — are
likely to facilitate growth through their impact on the bottom of the distribution, and to
inhibit growth through their impact on the top of the distribution.”(Voitchovsky, 2005)
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6.2.1 The Model
The model is an overlapping-generations model with inter-generational al-
truism. A single good can be produced by two different technologies:
• A technology that uses unskilled labor Lu only. The production func-
tion Y u is therefore given by:
Y u = wuLu (27)
where wu is the marginal productivity in the unskilled sector.
• A technology that uses skilled labor Ls and capital K. The production
function Y s is therefore given by:
Y s = F (K,Ls) (28)
where F is a concave function with constant returns to scale.
Production takes place in each period. For simplicity, investment in capital
is made one period in advance, there are no adjustment costs and there
is no depreciation of capital. Individuals live for two periods. We assume
that they have one parent and one child. Therefore there is no population
growth. They can work in the unskilled sector for two periods or they can
invest in human capital in the first period and work in the skilled sector in
the second period. The amount that is invested in human capital is denoted
as h. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor in each period.
Individuals are altruistic and care about their children. They leave them
bequests b that can be used for investment in human capital. Consumption
c is assumed to take only place in the second period. The utility of an
individual is therefore as follows:
U = α log c+ (1− α) log b (29)
Additionally we assume that all individuals are born with the same abilities
and the same preferences. They only differ in their initial endowment that
is dependent on the amount inherited.
Two assumptions are made: the rate of interest r is constant over time
and the access to capital is free for everyone. Individuals can lend any
amount of money on the capital markets at this rate while we assume that
borrowers can avoid paying back a loan by moving but this is costly. Lenders
can avoid this defaults but this also involves costs. This obviously implies
that individuals can not borrow at a rate of r but at a higher rate. The
borrowing rate is denoted as i > r. Firms can borrow money at r because
moving is more complicated for firms. The marginal productivity of capital
is therefore in the skilled sector:
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dF (K,Ls)
dK
= r (30)
This implies that there is a constant capital-labor ratio that determines the
skilled wage wswhich is constant over time.
The last necessary assumption is that the two labor markets and the
good market are perfectly competitive and expectations are rational.
6.2.2 Short-run analysis
• Capital market equilibrium
As we mentioned before the individual borrowing rate i has to be
higher than r since the lender has positive costs to trace back the
borrower. The basic concept is that a borrower borrows an amount
a and pays the interest ia. In a competitive market this has to cover
the interest of the lender as well as the cost of the lender z for tracing
back the borrower:
aia = ar + z (31)
and lenders choose z high enough to give no incentives of moving to
the borrowers:
a(1 + ia) = βz (32)
where β ∗ z is the cost of the borrower to evade even if the lender
invested an amount z to trace him back. Equation (31) and (32) lead
us to the result of the capital market clearing:
i = ia =
1 + βr
β − 1 (33)
• Individual behavior:
Looking at the individual investment decision leads us now to 3 cases.
We assume that an individual inherits the amount x in the first period
of life. Considering now the following cases:
– An individual that decides not to invest in human capital but
inherits an amount x has a Utility as follows:
Uu = log [(x+ wu)(1 + r) + wu] + ε
where:
ε = α logα + (1− α) log(1− α)
6 The Capital Market Imperfection Models 49
This individual is obviously a lender, meaning that it leaves a
bequest bu to its descendant:
bu = (1− α) [(x+ wu)(1 + r) + wu]
– An individual that inherits more than it invests in human capital
x > h has the following utility function:
U s = log [(x− h)(1 + r) + ws] + ε
This individual is also a lender, meaning that it leaves a bequest
bu to its descendant:
bs = (1− α) [(x− h)(1 + r) + ws]
– An individual that inherits less than it invests in human capital
x < h has the following utility function:
U s = log [(x− h)(1 + i) + ws] + ε
This individual is borrower(x − h < 0) and therefore paying the
higher interest i. It leaves a bequest bu to its descendant:
bs = (1− α) [(x− h)(1 + i) + ws]
It would make sense to assume that not all individuals work in the
unskilled sector, therefore we have to assume that the benefit from
investing in human capital and then working in the skilled sector is
higher than the benefit from working in the unskilled sector:
ws − h(1 + r) = wu + wu(1 + r) = wu(2 + r) (34)
With this assumption it is clear, that the potential lenders are going
to invest in human capital. For the potential borrowers it depends
whether their lifetime utility is higher when they work in the unskilled
sector or it is higher in the skilled sector. They would invest in human
capital if the following holds:
U s(x) = Uu(x)
⇒ x ≥ f = 1
i− r [w
u(2 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws] (35)
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Equation (35) (for calculations see also Appendix section B) shows
that education is limited to those who at least inherit an amount
more than f . Otherwise an individual would prefer to work in the
unskilled sector. This implies that only the amount inherited is de-
cisive over whether an individual invests in human capital or not. It
also determines the consumption and the bequest. The distribution of
inheritances among the individuals therefore determines the amount
of unskilled and skilled labor and therefore also the macroeconomic
performance of a country. Countries might differ in their initial distri-
bution of wealth and might therefore show different performances. It
can be shown that the dynamic process is not ergodic7 because of the
assumption that investment in human capital is indivisible. Therefore
the dynamic system does not lead to a single long-run distribution and
therefore to different long-run equilibria.
Combining equation (34) and equation (35) we result that f ≤ h (for
calculation see Appendix section B).
6.2.3 Long-run analysis
As mentioned before, the distribution of wealth in period t, Dt, determines:
• the investment in human capital
• the consumption of the individual
• the bequest of the individual
This basically means it determines the equilibrium in period t. But that is
not the whole story. The distribution therefore also determines the distri-
bution of wealth in the next period Dt+1:
xt+1 =

bu(xt) = (1− α) [(xt + wu)(1 + r) + wu] if xt < f
bs(xt) = (1− α) [(xt − h)(1 + i) + ws] if f ≤ xt < h
bs(xt) = (1− α) [(xt − h)(1 + r) + ws] if h ≤ xt
(36)
The dynamics in wealth distribution are shown in Figure 6 :
So the interesting question is what happens with individuals that have
a typical endowment in period t:
• individuals with an initial endowment xt < f will work in the un-
skilled sector and so will do their descendants. The amount inherited
converges to a certain level x¯u.
7 This means that all distributions converge to the same distribution in the long run
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Fig. 6: WEALTH DYNAMICS of Galor and Zeira(1993)
Source: Galor, O., & Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60 , pp. 35-52.
• individuals with an initial endowment f < xt < g might invest in
human capital but in the long-run their descendants end up working
in the unskilled sector. The amount inherited converges to a certain
level x¯u.
• individuals with an initial endowment xt > g will invest in human
capital and so will do their descendants, generation after generation.
The amount inherited converges to a certain level x¯s.
For the determination of g, x¯s and x¯u see the Appendix section B.
The long-run dynamics of the model are surprising: it creates a 2 classes
society with dynasties that stay in the unskilled sector and dynasties that
stay in the skilled sector. Some additional assumptions are necessary to
obtain this result. Obviously the slopes of bu and bs(when f ≤ xt < h) have
to be lower than one to get convergence to a stable point. Additionally the
slope of bs has to be higher than one, meaning that the spread between the
lending and borrowing interest rate is high enough. Otherwise the conver-
gence would be only to the unskilled class and we end up with a society in
which everyone works in the unskilled sector.
Focusing on the initial distribution of wealth Dt, the determination of
the size of the two groups in the long-run is not complicated. We know
that the number of unskilled workers in the long-run Lu∞is the same as the
number of individuals that inherit less than g in period t.
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Lu∞ = Lt(xt < g) =
gˆ
0
dDt(xt)
The long-run level of average wealth W is:
W =
Ls∞
L
x¯s +
Lu∞
L
x¯u =
L− Lu∞
L
x¯s +
Lu∞
L
x¯u = x¯s − L
u
∞
L
(x¯s − x¯u)
Since the amount inherited is higher for skilled workers than for unskilled
workers (x¯s > x¯u), the average wealth of the economy is decreasing in the
share of unskilled workers L
u∞
L
but:
W = x¯s − L
u
∞
L
(x¯s − x¯u) = x¯s − L− L
s
∞
L
(x¯s − x¯u) = x¯u + L
s
∞
L
(x¯s − x¯u)
and is therefore increasing with the share of skilled workers. This has
some interesting implications:
• an economy that is initially poor ends up poor
• an economy that is initially rich and the wealth is distributed among
many ends up rich
• an economy that is initially rich and the wealth is concentrated in the
hands of few ends up poor
The main result states: the bigger the middle class of a country, the better the
growth perspectives in the long-run. Economies converge to distinct long-run
equilibrium, depending on the initial distribution of wealth.
Whether all these assumptions are reasonable and realistic should be
questioned. The authors argue that their result is not dependent on the
logarithmic utility function. Also a more general form of the utility function
would result in a model where lifetime utility is related monotonically to the
bequest and therefore the dynamics and the results do not change.
The assumption of altruistic individuals is more challenging. First, it
is not clear whether this reflects reality in a meaningful way and is in the
eye of the beholder. Second, there are other ways of modeling the altruistic
behavior. This model assumes that utility is a function of consumption
and the bequest, while other authors model the altruistic behavior with
an utility function that depends on the utility of the next generation. It
might be possible that poor individuals save more in order to help their
descendants to jump from the unskilled sector to the high skilled sector.
Galor and Zeira(1990) show that this might be possible but for very poor
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individuals it will be not. That means the dynamics will be the same even
though the “upper class” might be larger in this case.
The short-run dynamics depend on the assumption of imperfect credit
markets but it does not matter how these are modeled. As long as there is a
difference in the borrowing rate and the lending rate, these dynamics will be
the same since it implies that people with higher wealth have easier access
to investment in human capital.
The long-run dynamics are based on the assumption that human capital
is indivisible. Galor and Zeira(1993) argue that this assumption is sufficient
for the results because Loury(1981) showed that assuming imperfect capital
markets and a production function that is smooth and convex in human cap-
ital, the distribution of wealth converges to a unique long-run equilibrium.
This would imply in the model of Galor and Zeira(1993) that all individuals
will invest the same amount in human capital in the long run.
The basic model assumes wages to be constant. This is not a realistic
assumption and therefore the model is extended to a model with variable
wages. Additionally the variable wage will help to analyze the relation be-
tween wealth and equality.
6.2.4 Extended model: Variable wage
To make the model more realistic and to get an insight on the relation be-
tween wealth and equality, variable wages are modeled by including a second
factor, namely land, to the production function in the unskilled sector:
Y u = G(Lu, N)
where N denotes the aggregated amount of land and G is the usual constant
returns to scale production function. Assuming that the aggregated amount
of land is fixed at a certain level N , the wage of unskilled workers can be
written as follows:
wu =
dG(Lu, N)
dL
= H(Lu)
where the function H models the diminishing marginal productivity of
unskilled labor.
To ease the determination of the supply of unskilled labor the assumption
that unskilled individuals work only in the first period of life is useful. We
get the labor supply therefore by the number of individuals that won’t invest
in human capital:
St =
f(wut )ˆ
0
dDt(xt)
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f(wut ) is the level of inheritance that changes the individual decision
from not investing to investing in human capital as in equation (35) and is
determined in the same way:
f(wut ) =
1
i− r [w
u
t (1 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws] (37)
Looking at equation (37) we see that at a certain level of wage in the un-
skilled sector individuals are indifferent between investing in human capital
or work as unskilled.
If there is a group that inherits the same amount at time t, the supply
curve becomes horizontal, if the distribution is such that there are no indi-
viduals in a certain area of inheritance (e.g. between f(w0) and f(w1)), the
supply curve becomes vertical between w0 and w1. The equilibrium of the
unskilled labor market can be seen in figure 7 and determines:
• the amount of unskilled labor,
• the wage of unskilled labor and also
• the number of individuals that invest in human capital
Fig. 7: Unskilled Labor Market with Flexible Wage
Source: Galor, O., & Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60 , pp. 35-52.
The only difference in the dynamics compared to the basic model is that
wage of unskilled workers is not longer fixed. It is determined endogenously
and depends again on the distribution of wealth:
xt+1 =

bu(xt) = (1− α) [(xt + wut )(1 + r)] if xt < f(wut )
bs(xt) = (1− α) [(xt − h)(1 + i) + ws] if f(wut ) ≤ xt < h
bs(xt) = (1− α) [(xt − h)(1 + r) + ws] if h ≤ xt
(38)
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The dynamics are shown in figure 8:
Fig. 8: Wealth Dynamics with Flexible Wage
Source: Galor, O., & Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60 , pp. 35-52.
The only difference to the basic model is now that the bu line depends
on the unskilled wage and therefore shifts if the wage changes. An economy
with high equilibrium wage for unskilled labor in period t and f(wut ) > g is
defined as a developed economy.
By simple calculation (see Appendix section B) the following holds:
wg =
1
(1 + r)
[h(1 + i)− ws] (i− r − αi+ αr − 1)
(i− α− iα)
An economy is developed if wut > wg. Intuitively this means if the number
of people with high inheritances is large. Such a situation is described in
figure 8 by the bˆucurve.
A less developed economy is indicated by the bu line and defined by
wut ≤ wg in figure 8. In a less developed economy, individual who inherit
more than g leave a bequest that is larger than what they inherit while
individuals who inherit less than g leave a bequest lower than what they
inherit. Therefore the supply curve gets steeper around wg in the next
period because less people will have a a certain level of inheritance close
to f(wg). This means that the wage shifts downwards as well (wut > wut+1)
and the bequest gets smaller and smaller. In the long run, the supply curve
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becomes vertical and the equilibrium point will be point A in figure 8 and
9. The long-run level of wealth for unskilled can be seen in figure 8 at point
A. The number of workers in the long-run equals the number of individuals
that inherit less than g in period t.
Fig. 9: Dynamics in a Less Developed Economy
Source: Galor, O., & Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60 , pp. 35-52.
Turning now to a developed economy the dynamics are different. We
assume now that wut > wg. Now each individual bequeaths more than it
inherits. This means the supply curve shifts to the left. The unskilled wage
starts to rise (wut < wut+1) as shown in figure 10. The long-run supply curve
will be horizontal and the equilibrium point will be B. The unskilled wage
rate is reached at ws
(1+r)
− h and at this point, bn = bs. In this equilibrium
the net life-time income of all workers (skilled and unskilled) is the same.
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Fig. 10: Dynamics in a developed economy
Source: Galor, O., & Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60 , pp. 35-52.
It is important to note that the long-run equilibrium depends on the
distribution of wealth in the starting period. Galor and Zeira(1993) conclude
the following from the model:
1. A less developed country converges to an unequal distribution of income
2. A developed country converges toward an equal distribution of income
6.2.5 Summary
The model of Galor an Zeira(1993) shows basically two important things:
1. Developed countries converge to a more equal distribution of income
than less developed countries and the wage differences should be smaller
in developed countries.
2. Countries with a more equal initial distribution of wealth tend to grow
faster and converge to a higher income level in the long-run
It should be noted that the model might explain the empirical findings in a
new way. While e.g. Kuznets(1955) interpreted the differences in the dis-
tribution of incomes across countries by the different levels of development,
Galor and Zeira(1993) point out that this differences exist because countries
converge to different long-run equilibrium.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
As the model of Galor and Zeira(1993) and others show, income and wealth
inequality leads to underinvestment in human capital and therefore harms
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growth under capital market constraints. Depending on the depth of these
constraints, the effect will be more or less relevant.
Other CMI models (e.g. Aghion and Bolton(1997)) show that lower
inequality has growth enhancing and growth reducing effects, leading to
ambiguous results. Additionally, Foellmi and Oechslin(2008) show that re-
distribution to the poor will be growth enhancing especially in countries
with weak capital markets.
7 Other models
There are of course models that are neither based on the political econ-
omy approach nor assume imperfect capital markets. Some of them will be
presented in this section.
Alesina and Perotti(1996) argue that more inequality tends to increase
social discontent and therefore increases the probability of revolutions, mass
violence and so on. This means it produces uncertainty in the political en-
vironment and threats property rights. This uncertainty of course harms
investment and as investment is one of the engines of economic growth, in-
come inequality harms economic growth. The empirical results are in line
with the theoretical argument that political instability harms investment.
The authors mention that this might explain the relative poor growth per-
formances of South American countries compared to South East Asian coun-
tries after World War II. South East Asian countries set in a land reform
that led to a decrease in inequality and therefore to a more stable political
environment while South American countries failed to set in a land reform
and therefore faced more political instability.
García-Penalosa and Turnovsky(2005) developed an AK-model without
capital market imperfections. The main argument of their analysis is that
wealthier individuals tend to supply less labor than poor ones. Labor supply
is endogenous and individuals only differ in their initial capital endowments.
The distribution of income and economic growth is therefore determined si-
multaneously. This implies that all policies that influence the growth rate
also have in implication on the distribution of income. Any fiscal policy
that increases the labor supply will therefore increase the income inequal-
ity(before taxes). The model will be presented in section IV.
In another paper of García-Penalosa and Turnovsky(2006) again assume
that labor supply is endogenous and individuals only differ in their initial
capital endowments but now using a Ramsey model. Under these assump-
tions the accumulation of capital tends to reduce wealth inequality but they
also show when the elasticity of substitution is high, wealth inequality and
income inequality need not necessary move in the same direction towards
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the steady state. They also show that an increase in productivity has an
equalizing effect if the source of inequality is the wealth distribution. A de-
crease in the population growth rate will decrease income inequality because
it leads to a reduction of labor supply and therefore increases the capital-
labor ratio. This increases the wage and decreases the return on capital
therefore leading to more equality in income.
Halter, Zweimüller and Oechslin(2010) argue that most theories that
predict a positive relation between inequality and economic growth are based
on economic mechanisms while most of the theories that predict a negative
relation are based on political arguments or on human capital. This implies
that the positive relation is more valid in the short-run while the negative
effect will be only striking in the long-run. This implies that the overall effect
in the long-run is ambiguous, while the short-run effect should be positive.
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Part IV. Policy Implications
After presenting a wide range of theories on the relation between income
inequality and growth the next chapter will present the main policy impli-
cations that are pointed out by the theories mentioned in the previous two
chapters. Theories on the relation of income inequality and growth are not
always in line in their results. Therefore the policy implications differ as
well. In the first section the implications of fiscal policy are analyzed while
the second section presents the redistributive policy recommendations of the
theories mentioned so far.
8 Fiscal Policies
For fiscal policy analysis, a typical AK-model8 as used by García-Penalosa
and Turnovsky(2005) will be presented. A subsidy on investment is added
to the model. This subsidy has an growth enhancing effect but has to be
financed by a tax (e. g. a capital, income or consumption tax). The model
allows to show the effects of such policies on income distribution (not only
for income before taxes but also for income after-taxes).
8.1 The model of García-Penalosa and
Turnovsky(2005)
8.1.1 The model
Firms The typical production function for each firm j is used for the model:
Yj = A(L
jK)α(Kj)1−α 0 < α < 1 (39)
where Kj is the firm j′s capital stock and Lj firm j′s employment of labor.
K denotes the average economy-wide capital stock and LjK is therefore a
measure for the efficiency units of labor employed by the firm. Since all
firms are supposed to be identically, they choose the same level of labor
and capital. Therefore also the economy-wide average capital stock and
labor stock are the same as each firms individual capital stock and labor
stock (Kj = K and Lj = L). Assuming labor market clearing, the average
economy-wide working time is L = 1 − l (every individual is endowed with
one unit of time that can be used for leisure or for work), where l is the
average leisure time.
The aggregated production function can be derived as follows:
8 The AK-model is an endogenous growth model that states that the production func-
tion is linear in the capital stock
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Y = ALαK 0 < α < 1 (40)
The aggregated production function is linear in the average capital stock.
To derive the equilibrium factor prices, we differentiate the aggregated pro-
duction function with respect to the factors capital and labor:
w =
dY
dL
= αA(1− l)α−1K (41)
r =
dY
dK
= (1− α)A(1− l)α (42)
While wage is increasing with the aggregated capital stock K and therefore
grows with the economy, the return to capital is independent of the capital
stock.
Consumers Consumers are initially endowed with a different capital stock
Ki0 but do not differ in any other aspect. The individual share in the total
capital stock is given as ki = Ki
K
and is distributed with the function G(ki)
with mean
∑
ki = 1 and variance σ2k .
A consumer maximizes its life-time utility that depends on consumption
and leisure. Assuming an isoelastic utility function leads to the following
maximization problem of the consumer:
max
´∞
0
1
β
(Cit(l
i)η)
β
e−ρtdt (43)
with −∞ < β < 1 , η > 0 and 1 > β(1 + η)
where the parameter η denotes the elasticity of leisure in utility. The con-
sumers capital accumulation constraint tells that the change in the capital
stock over time is the difference between the consumers income and its con-
sumption:
(1− s)dK
i
dt
= (1− τK)rKi + (1− τW )(1− l)w − (1− τC)Ci (44)
where s denotes a subsidy to investment in capital and τ denotes a tax on
capital income (τK) , on labor income (τW ) or on consumption (τC). Since
the wage rate depends on the aggregated capital stock (see equation (41)),
also the individual capital accumulation depends on the aggregated capital
stock.
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Government Also the government faces a constraint in the model. We
assume that the government has to have a balanced budget at each time t.
Therefore the following equation has to hold:
s
dK
dt
= τKrK + τW (1− li)w + τCC (45)
where C denotes the aggregated consumption and l the economy-wide aver-
age time of leisure. The intuition behind that equation is that the amount
spent for the investment subsidy can not exceed the tax income at any time.
Consumer maximization The maximization problem was already men-
tioned above. A consumer chooses the rate of consumption, leisure and cap-
ital accumulation that maximizes its utility such that the individual capital
accumulation equation (44) is fulfilled:
max
´∞
0
1
β
(Cit(l
i)η)
β
e−ρtdt
s.t. (1− s)dKi
dt
= (1− τK)rKi + (1− τW )(1− li)w − (1− τC)Ci
The solution to this maximization problem is shown in the Appendix in
Part D and the result can be stated as follows:
dCi
Ci
dt
=
dC
C
dt
=
dKi
Ki
dt
=
dK
K
dt
= γ =
r
(
1−τK
1−s
)− ρ
1− β (46)
Since all individuals choose the same growth rate for consumption and cap-
ital, the growth rate of average capital stock and average consumption will
be the same.
Additionally we get the relative labor supply function (for calculations
see Appendix Part D) which indeed is responsible for equating the growth
rates of individuals:
li − l =
(
l − η
1 + η
)
(ki − 1) (47)
Since ki is not changing over time and García-Penalosa and Turnovsky(2005)
show that l > η
1+η
, individuals that have a higher initial endowment of
capital ki choose more leisure li and therefore supply less labor. Intuitively
this can be traced back to a lower marginal utility of wealth for wealthier
individuals.
Macroeconomic Equilibrium Assuming that the economy is always on
its balanced growth path we get the following equilibrium conditions:
• Equilibrium growth rate:
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γ =
r
(
1−τK
1−s
)− ρ
1− β
• Aggregated consumption-capital ratio: (for calculations see Appendix
section D)
C
K
=
(1−τW )
(1+τC)
αA(1− l)α−1l
η
• The goods market equilibrium:
γ = A(1− l)α − C
K
• The government’s budget constraint:
s
dK
dt
= τKrK + τW (1− li)w + τCC
sγ = τKr + τW (1− li)αA(1− l)α−1 + τC C
K
The equilibrium conditions summarized in two equations:
γ =
r
(
1−τK
1−s
)− ρ
1− β (48)
and
γ = A(1− l)α −
(1−τW )
(1+τC)
αA(1− l)α−1l
η
γ = A(1− l)α
(
1−
(1−τW )
(1+τC)
αl(1− l)−1
η
)
(49)
where equation (49) is derived by combining the goods market equilibrium
and the aggregate consumption-capital ratio.
8.1.2 The economy without government intervention:
In this analysis, for simplicity, the government does not intervene in the
economic process by taxes or subsidies. The macroeconomic equilibrium
conditions will be therefore easier to interpret and will be stated above:
γ =
r − ρ
1− β =
(1− α)A(1− l)α − ρ
1− β (50)
and
γ = A(1− l)α
(
1− αl
η(1− l)
)
(51)
Note that the growth rate γ is decreasing in l in both equations:
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• Equation (50) intuitively reflects the fact that more leisure reduces
output and therefore increases the consumption-output ratio. This
decreases the growth rate.
• Equation (51) intuitively reflects the fact that more leisure decreases
the productivity of capital. This implies a fall in the return of con-
sumption and therefore leads to a decrease in the growth rate.
8.1.3 Income distribution:
After determining the equilibrium, not only the distribution of capital but
also the distribution of income is of interest. The individual income before-
taxes is given as the sum of individual capital income and individual wage
income (Y i = rKi + w(1 − li)) while the average economy-wide income
is given as the sum of average economy-wide capital income and average
economy-wide wage income (Y = rK + w(1 − l)). Individual i’s relative
income yi is therefore:
yi =
Y i
Y
=
rKi + w(1− li)
rK + w(1− l)
⇒ yi − 1 = λ(l)(ki − 1) where λ(l) = 1− α
(1 + η)(1− l) (52)
Calculations are shown in the Appendix in Part D. Equation (52) shows
that the distribution of pre-tax income depends on two factors:
• the initial distribution of capital and
• and the chosen amount of leisure in equilibrium (since this determines
the factor prices)
García-Penalosa and Turnovsky(2005) show, that as long as the equilibrium
is one of positive growth, 0 < λ(l) < 1. Therefore, relative income yi
is strictly increasing in the relative capital endowment ki. This leads to
the conclusion, that even though richer individuals supply less labor, the
effect of higher capital endowment is still not offset. But as a consequence,
the standard deviation of income across individuals σy (as a measure of
income inequality) has to be smaller than the standard deviation of capital
endowments across individuals σK .
As a consequence the following equation holds:
σy = λ(l)σK
Given σK , σy is a decreasing and concave function of the average economy-
wide leisure time l because more leisure will increase the wage w but de-
creases the return on capital r. This lowers the range of total income in the
8 Fiscal Policies 65
economy. Knowing the equilibrium allocation of labor l and the distribution
of initial capital will therefore lead us to the variability of income across
individuals.
The same procedure can be done for after-tax income and will lead to
almost the same results. The calculations are similar as for the pre-tax
income:
yia = 1− λa(l, τW , τK)(1− ki) (53)
where λa(l, τW , τK) = λ(l) + (1− λ(l))(1− α) (τW−τK)α(1+τW )+(1−α)(1−τK) (54)
and therefore the standard deviation of after-tax income can be written as:
σya = λa(l, τW , τK)σ
K
Comparing the pre-tax distribution and the after-tax distribution of income,
one can see that the latter shows higher dispersion only if the tax on labor
is higher than the tax on capital (τW > τK).
From equation (53) one can see the effects of the income taxes on the
after-tax distribution of income:
• Income taxes influence the consumers labor supply choice, therefore
changing the gross factor prices and therefore the before-tax income(ρ(l)
in equation (54) )
• The direct redistributive effects are covered in the other part of equa-
tion (54) : A higher tax on capital decreases this part, while a higher
tax on labor increases it.
Note that a tax on consumption or an investment subsidy affects the after-
tax distribution only indirectly since they only have an impact on the labor
supply.
8.1.4 Summarizing the model:
The model can be easily plotted in a graph (see figure 11) , where:
RR : γ =
r
(
1−τK
1−s
)− ρ
1− β
PP : γ = A(1− l)α
(
1−
(1−τW )
(1+τC)
αl(1− l)−1
η
)
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DD : σy = λ(l)σK
Fig. 11: Equilibrium Growth, Leisure and Income Distribution
Source: García-Penalosa, C., & Turnovsky, S. (2005). “Growth, Income Inequality and
Fiscal Policy: What are the Relevant Tradeoffs?”, Working Paper Universités d’Aix-
Marseille .
Point Q determines the equilibrium growth rate and the average economy-
wide leisure time and point M the standard deviation of pre-tax income.
8.2 Policy implications of the Model
One can summarize the main implications of the model for policy makers
in general with three arguments assuming that the initial distribution of
capital across individuals is given:
1. Fiscal policy influences the pre-tax income distribution through its ef-
fects on the individual labor supply choice.
This can be seen in equation (52) as fiscal policies change the individual
labor supply and therefor also the economy wide labor supply.
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2. Any fiscal policy that increases the supply of labor increases pre-tax
income inequality and vica versa.
Again, equation (52) points out that any policy that increases the
labor supply ((1 − l) ↑) increases λ(l) and therefore increases yi, the
before-tax income.
3. A tax on labor and a tax on capital influence the post-tax distribution
directly but also indirectly by changing the labor supply. A consumption
tax and a investment subsidy only influences the distribution of post-
tax income by the latter effect.
Equation (53) shows the effects on the after-tax income distribution.
We can again see that there is an effect due to a change in labor supply
(covered by λ(l)). Additionally, a tax on labor and a tax on capital
directly influence the after-tax income.
The authors mention that the decentralized economy produces a sub-optimal
growth rate. An investment subsidy will move the equilibrium closer to the
social optimum but there are different ways of financing this subsidy. An
investment subsidy will raise the return on capital and therefore favors indi-
viduals with high capital endowment. This reverse effect on redistribution
might be avoided by the way of financing this subsidy.
• Financing the investment subsidy by a tax on capital income (see figure 12):
A higher investment subsidy s will shift the RR-curve upwards (s ↑
, 1 − s ↓, 1
1−s ↑, γ ↑ cet. par.). The equilibrium Q will therefore shift
leftwards to the new equilibrium Q’ that shows higher growth and less
average economy-wide leisure time.
An increase in the tax rate on capital will have the adverse effect on
the RR-curve (τK ↑, 1− τK ↓, γ ↓). Therefore the overall effect is not
clear. It depends on the the size of the capital tax that is needed to
finance the investment subsidy. One can show that the effect of the
subsidy will dominate the effect of the capital tax. As a result, the
overall effects are a higher growth rate, a lower average economy-wide
leisure time and additionally M moves to the left till it reaches M’,
meaning that pre-tax income inequality rises.
A capital tax obviously ensures that λa(l, τW , τK) < λ(l) meaning that
the inequality in after-tax income declines.
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Fig. 12: The effects of a capital tax in the García-Penalosa and Turnovsky
(2005) model
• Financing the investment subsidy by a tax on wage income (see figure 13):
In this case, the RR-curve shifts upwards because of the investment
subsidy (as before). The tax on labor will shift the PP -curve upwards (
τW ↑, 1− τW ↓, 1− 1−τW ↑, γ ↑). The overall effect is more complicated
in this case. The growth rate will increase while the effect on the
average economy-wide labor supply is not clear because the wage tax
decreases labor supply while the subsidy that enhances growth will
increase the labor supply.
If the labor supply increases, the pre-tax income inequality will in-
crease and the post-tax income will increase as well. But if the labor
supply decreases the pre-tax income inequality will decrease while the
post-tax income inequality may increase or decrease.
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Fig. 13: The effects of a labor tax in the García-Penalosa and Turnovsky
(2005) model
• Financing the investment subsidy by a tax on consumption (see figure 14):
In this case, λa(l, τW , τK) = λ(l). The RR-curve shifts upwards be-
cause of the investment subsidy (as before). The tax on consumption
will shift the PP -curve upwards ( τC ↑, 1+τC ↑, 1− 1+τC ↑, γ ↑). Again
the growth rate will increase. García-Penalosa and Turnovsky(2005)
show, that the average economy-wide leisure will decline therefore lead-
ing to an increase in pre-tax income inequality. Since the consumption
tax has no direct redistributional effect, pre- and post-income inequal-
ity are the same and therefore the post-tax income inequality increases
as well.
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Fig. 14: The effects of a consumption tax in the García-Penalosa and
Turnovsky (2005) model
Table 14 summarizes the effects of an investment subsidy that is financed
by either a tax on capital, on labor or on consumption.
All three cases lead to a higher growth rate even though the taxes itself
would decrease the growth rate. Therefore the growth enhancing effect of
the investment subsidy dominates the effect of the taxes. Fiscal policy will
increase the pre-tax income in two cases while in the case of a tax on labor
the effect is ambiguous. This is in line with the findings of Forbes(2000) and
others. The mechanism behind that is that higher growth demands a higher
labor supply, therefore reducing the wage rate and increasing the return to
capital. This mechanism obviously increases the inequality in income.
As shown, pre-tax and post-tax income inequality need not move in line.
The indirect effect (as mentioned above) of the subsidy is always the same,
while the direct effect depends on the tax that is chosen to finance the
subsidy. The consumption tax has no redistributive effect, the labor tax
redistributes towards those with high capital endowment while the tax on
capital redistributes to those with lower capital endowment. The question
is whether this direct effects can be large enough to offset the positive effect
of the investment subsidy on income inequality.
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Tab. 14: The effects of an investment subsidy financed by dif. policies
Policy
instrument
growth
rate
labor
supply
pre-tax
income
inequality
post-tax
income
inequality
wage
tax
↑ ↑ or ↓ ↑ or ↓ ↑ or ↓
capital
tax
↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
consumption
tax
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
A subsidy financed by a tax on capital is the only policy instrument that
enhance growth and might decrease the post-tax inequality. A subsidy fi-
nanced by a tax on labor stimulates growth and might decrease pre-tax in-
equality depending on the effect it has on the labor supply. From the pure
growth-enhancing point of view, a financing by a consumption tax will be
superior to a financing by a tax on labor and in turn to financing by a tax
on capital9.
8.3 Remarks
The model of García-Penalosa and Turnovsky is a model that does not
assume capital market imperfections. Labor supply is determined endoge-
nously, individuals differ in their initial capital endowment and therefore
growth and income distribution are determined. Therefore policies that in-
fluence the growth rate automatically influence the distribution of income.
The main mechanism behind that is the wealth effect: Individuals that are
endowed with more capital will supply less labor. This means that labor
is more equally distributed compared to the capital endowment. Obviously
any policy that tries to increase labor supply (and therefore be growth en-
9 see: García-Penalosa, C., & Turnovsky, S. (2005). Growth, Income Inequality and
Fiscal Policy: What are the Relevant Tradeoffs? Working Paper Universités d’Aix-
Marseille
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hancing) raises the relative return to capital and therefore puts more weight
on the source of inequality.
There are two limitations of the model:
• The AK-model and the assumption that individuals differ only in the
initial endowments of capital leads to the absence of income dynam-
ics. But this is often used for policy analysis (e. g. Alesina and
Rodrik(1994)).
• Also other central elements that influence the growth-income inequal-
ity relation such as human capital and education are neglected in the
model10.
• The AK-model in general does not predict convergence of per capita
GDP levels and there are no transitional dynamics. Every solution is
a balanced growth path.
9 Redistributive Policies
Redistributive policy is always an interesting topic. It has deep impact
on society and often leads to tough discussions whether redistribution is
good or not. Society and policy makers have different views on the topic.
This section tries to answer whether redistribution from rich to poor will
have a positive or a negative effect on economic growth. From the political
point of view, especially the negative relation between income inequality and
economic growth has an interesting side result: It would not only decrease
income inequality but would also foster growth.
The first subsection will show the distributive policy recommendations of
the political economy models, the second subsection will focus on the policy
implications of the capital market imperfection models.
9.1 Political-Economy
The policy implications of the political economy models are ambiguous.
While Alesina and Rodrik(1994) suggests that equality (and therefore redis-
tribution) is a necessary condition for high growth, Alesina and Perotti(1996)
and Li and Zou(1998) argue that the overall effect of redistribution is am-
biguous. One should mention, that dynamic analysis is not possible in these
models.
Alesina and Rodrik(1994) argue that the government has to provide a
public service that is necessary for private production. The public service
is financed by a tax on capital and of course every individual would like
10 for a model with human capital see Galor and Zeira(1993)
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to have this public good. The model shows that the higher the income
inequality, the higher the chosen tax rate that distorts the economy and the
lower economic growth. Redistribution would therefore be growth enhancing
for the economy. Li and Zou(1998) show that if this public good is not
only used for production but also for consumption services, the effect will
be ambiguous leading to the result that the effect of redistribution might
foster growth, but it can also be the case that it harms growth. In the
theoretical framework of Alesina and Perotti(1996) redistribution in form
of higher taxation of capitalists and investors has mainly two effects on the
economic performance:
• higher taxation on capitalists and investors will decrease the propensity
to invest. As investment is one of the main engines of economic growth
the redistributive policy will dampen economic growth.
• the redistribution will lead to more stability in the political system
and reduces uncertainty. This indeed should increase investment and
therefore foster growth.
The overall effect of fiscal redistribution will foster growth if the indirect
positive effect of lower inequality will overweight the direct negative effect
on investment. In reality it is not clear that the redistribution will decrease
the propensity to invest in general. The overall effect of redistribution on
investment can also be in the other direction (see e.g. Foellmi and Oechslin,
2008).
Alesina and Rodrik(1994) show in their model that in an economy with
high inequality, the tax rate on capital will be higher than the growth maxi-
mizing tax rate. In the model, the capital tax can be seen as a redistributive
policy that transfers income to unskilled labor and additionally harms cap-
ital accumulation. To enhance growth, it is necessary that policy makers
reduce inequality through redistribution. Obviously the government could
finance the productive service also with other taxes than a capital tax. The
authors point out that the effects of taxes that redistribute from capital to
labor will have most likely the same effects as a capital tax.
Li and Zou(1998) show that the model of Alesina and Rodrik(1994) will
predict the revers result assuming that the public service will be a consump-
tion service and therefore only enters the utility function of individuals. But
the authors point out that the reality lies in between the two models. Pub-
lic service will be partly used for production services and for consumption
services. In this case, the overall effect of inequality on economic growth
is ambiguous and therefore also the policy implications are not clear. One
might argue that if the government concentrates its activities more on the
production side, redistribution will enhance growth while when it concen-
trates more on the consumption services, redistribution might harm growth.
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9.2 Capital Market Imperfections
The policy implication that arises from most of the capital-market imper-
fection models is that there exist redistributive policies that are growth
enhancing. Transfers and subsidies for borrowers are an efficient policy tool
in this case.
In the Galor and Zeira(1993) model, subsidies for poor and transfers
from rich to poor individuals are growth enhancing because more capital-
poor people are able to invest in human capital. Obviously this is in line
with educational policies such as increased access to education. All this
policies will increase growth while they will decrease inequality in income.
Wealth redistribution in the model can increase output and income in the
short-run as well as in the long run. But this is not a Pareto improvement.
A subsidy on education in the Galor and Zeira(1993) model that is financed
by a tax on skilled workers in the next period is shown in figure 15:
Fig. 15: A subsidy on education in the Galor and Zeira(1993) model
This policy will shift the bs curve leftwards (since it reduces the individual
costs for investment in human capital h) and f and g will decrease to f ′and
g′. This policy increases investment and output not only in the short-run but
also in the long-run and it will be an Pareto improvement if the collecting
costs for debt is higher than the collecting costs for taxes. This seems
reasonable when we consider that a tax system already exists.
In the model of Aghion and Bolton(1997), even though there is a trickle-
down effect of wealth from the rich to the poor, the distribution of resources
in the economy is not efficient. Basically there are two policy implications:
1. The authors show that permanent wealth redistribution from the rich
lenders to the middle-class and poor borrowers will lead to more effi-
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ciency in the economy. The mechanism behind that is that redistri-
bution equalizes the opportunities to invest in profitable investments.
Even though the redistribution from rich to poor will decreases the
output and effort of the rich, the increase in output and effort of the
poor will be higher. Therefore redistribution leads to more aggregate
efficiency in the economy in its steady state.
2. Temporary redistribution can not increase the efficiency of the econ-
omy in the steady state, but it can help the economy to achieve the
steady state faster.
Foellmi and Oechslin(2008) point out that under the assumption of im-
perfect capital markets only redistribution to the poorest will increase eco-
nomic performance. More inequality coming from the bottom-end distri-
bution is therefore less favorable than inequality that arises between upper
class and middle class. The argument in favor of this redistributional poli-
cies is that the poorest face the highest marginal returns on investment. For
redistributive policies, that should work especially against an imperfect cap-
ital market, Foellmi and Oechslin(2008) stated: “The model highlights the
importance of including not only the middle class but also the least aﬄuent
individuals - in particular if the local credit market is not well integrated
into the world market”[13]
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Part V. Conclusion
The thesis shows that there is a wide range of empirical studies but also nu-
merous theoretical thoughts that do not produce the same results. Therefore
the question whether income inequality harms or fosters growth can not be
ultimately answered. This contrasting predictions call for further research
in this field.
But as an concluding remark, two main thoughts are worthwhile to be
mentioned:
1. As Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller(2010) argue, the contrasting re-
sults in theories and empirical results can be traced back to the ne-
glected time dimension. Theories that are based on economic mech-
anisms and therefore work in the short run usually predict a positive
relation between income inequality and economic growth. Theories
that are based on social and political mechanisms (e.g. political deci-
sions) which become only effective in the long-run result in a negative
relation. The overall effect therefore is ambiguous, depending on which
effect is stronger. This might also explain the different empirical re-
sults of older and more recent research. Older research was based
on short-term effects while the latter focused more on the long-run
relation.
2. Galor and Moave(2004) argue that the main engine of growth is in
early stages of the development is physical capital accumulation while
in later stages it will be human capital accumulation. In this early
stages, inequality enhances growth because it distributes resources to
people whose marginal propensity to save is higher. In later stages
of the economic development as human capital accumulates, there is
increasing demand for human capital, which indeed will be then the
prime engine of economic growth. Under the assumption of imperfect
capital markets more equality will stimulate the investment in human
capital and therefore enhance growth. In the last stages of economic
development, as individuals get richer and credit constraints become
less binding, the effect of the income distribution on the growth pro-
cess becomes less significant. Thus, for countries with relatively low
return to human capital, income inequality might foster growth while
in economies with relatively high returns to human capital and where
credit constraints are binding, income inequality might be harmful for
growth.
Combining these two arguments for policy consideration, the relation be-
tween income inequality and economic growth depends not only on a coun-
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try’s stage of economic development but also on the time-dimension the
policy targets on.
Policy makers have to keep in mind that there might be a distortion of
incentives that goes in line with redistributive policies. Well-targeted and
well-financed subsidies and the improvement of the access to education are
win-win policies that not only decrease inequality but also enhance growth.
There is still a lot room for improvement in theories and in empirical
research. Especially in recent literature, the question arises whether mea-
suring inequality by the Gini coefficient is sufficient. The question of how to
redistribute and how much to redistribute is still not answered. But also in
the classical literature the general point of view was already the same. As
Adam Smith already stated in The Wealth of Nation(1776) : “No society
can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable.”
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Appendix
A. Calculations in the Alesina and Rodrik model (1994):
• The solution of the first maximization problem:
max
´
log ci ∗ e−ρtdt
s.t. dk
i
dt
= yi − ci = ησiki + (r − τ)ki − ci
the variation principle states that a reallocation of consumption be-
tween different periods does not improve overall utility. The solution
is called the Euler-Equation and has the general form:
dci
dt
ci
=
(r − τ)− ρ
−U´´∗c
U´
i
in our case it implies the following:
dci
dt
ci
=
(r − τ)− ρ
−−(ci)−2ci
(ci)−1
=
(r − τ)− ρ
(ci)−1
(ci)−1
= (r − τ)− ρ
• To obtain the growth maximizing tax rate, maximize the growth rate
γ(τ) with respect to the tax rate τ :
max γ(τ) = (r − τ)− ρ = αAτ 1−α − τ − ρ
– the FOC is as follows:
(1− α)αAτ−α − 1 = 0
τα = (1− α)αA
τ ∗ = [(1− α)αA]1/α
• Obtaining the first side condition of the maximization problem 18 by
combining equation (14) and (16)
dki
dt
= yi − ci = ησiki + (r − τ)ki − ci
dki
dt
ki
= (r − τ)− ρ ⇒ dk
i
dt
= (r − τ − ρ)ki
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– subtracting one in the other will lead us to:
(r − τ − ρ)ki = ησiki + (r − τ)ki − ci
ci = (ησi + ρ)ki
• the government maximization problem looks as follows:
max Ui =
´
log ci ∗ e−ρtdt
s.t.
dki
dt
ki
= γ(τ) = r − τ − ρ
dk
dt
k
= γ(τ) = r − τ − ρ
ci = [ησi + ρ] ki
– since we know that also ci grows at a constant rate we can rewrite
our constraints as :
ci =
[
ησi + ρ
]
ki = ci0e
γt
– plugging this into the Utility function will lead to:
maxUi =
ˆ (
log ci0 + γt
)
e−ρtdt
– by simple calculations we get:
Ui = log c
i
0 ∗
ˆ
e−ρtdt+ γ
ˆ
te−ρtdt
Ui = log
[(
ησi + ρ
)
ki0
]ˆ
e−ρtdt+ γ
ˆ
te−ρtdt
Ui = log
[(
ησi + ρ
)
ki0
] 1
ρ
+ γ
1
ρ2
Ui =
1
ρ
[
log
(
ησi + ρ
)
+ log(ki0) +
γ
ρ
]
– now maximizing this indirect utility function will lead us to:
1
ρ
[
η′(τ)σi
(η ∗ σi + ρ) +
γ′(τ)
ρ
]
= 0
83
– Rewriting this will give us the result of the individuals preferred
tax rate:
1
ρ
[
η′(τ)σ
(η ∗ σi + ρ) +
γ′(τ)
ρ
]
= 0
−γ
′(τ)
ρ2
=
η′(τ)σi
(ησi + ρ) ρ
−γ
′(τ)
ρ
=
η′(τ)σi
(ησi + ρ)
−γ′(τ) (ησi + ρ) = η′(τ)σiρ
– we know that γ′(τ) = d(r(τ)−τ−ρ)
dτ
= d(αA(τ
i)1−α−τ−ρ)
dτ
= αA(1 −
α)(τ i)−α − 1 and η′(τ) = (1 − α)2A(τ i)−α. Therefore we can
write the equation as follows:(
1− αA(1− α)(τ i)−α) (ησi + ρ) = (1− α)2A(τ i)−ασiρ
τ i (1− αA(1− α)(τ i)−α) (ησi + ρ)
τ i(1− α)2A(τ i)−α = σ
iρ
(τ i − αA(1− α)(τ i)1−α) (ησi + ρ)
(1− α)2A(τ i)1−α = σ
iρ
(τ i − αη) (ησi + ρ)
(1− α)η = σ
iρ
(
τ i − αη) = (1− α)ησiρ
(ησi + ρ)
τ i
[
1− αA(1− α)(τ i)−α] = ρ(1− α) η(τ i)σi
η(τ i)σi + ρ
B. Calculations in the Galor and Zeira(1993) model:
• Determination of f :
U s = Uu
log [(x− h)(1 + i) + ws] + ε = log [(x+ wu)(1 + r) + wu] + ε
(x− h)(1 + i) + ws = (x+ wu)(1 + r) + wu
x(1 + i)− x(1 + r) = wu(1 + r) + wu + h(1 + i)− ws
x(i− r) = wu(2 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws
x = [w
u(2 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws]
i− r = f
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• Additionally we can show that f ≤ g because we know:
ws − h(1 + r) = wu + wu(1 + r) = wu(2 + r)
⇒ f = [w
u(2 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws]
i− r
f 5 1
i− r [w
s − h(1 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws]
f 5 1
i− r h [−1− r + 1 + i]
f 5 h
• Determination of the long-run convergence levels:
x¯u = (1− α) [(x¯u + wu)(1 + r) + wu]
x¯u − (1− α)x¯u(1 + r) = (1− α)wu(1 + r) + wu(1− α)
x¯u [1− (1− α)(1 + r)] = wu(1− α)(1 + 1 + r)
x¯u =
wu(1− α)(2 + r)
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
x¯s = (1− α) [(x¯s − h)(1 + r) + ws]
x¯s − (1− α)x¯s(1 + r) = (1− α) [−h(1 + r) + ws]
x¯s [1− (1− α)(1 + r)] = (1− α) [−h(1 + r) + ws]
x¯s =
(1− α) [−h(1 + r) + ws]
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]
g = (1− α) [(g − h)(1 + i) + ws]
g − (1− α)g(1 + i) = (1− α) [−h(1 + i) + ws]
g [1− (1− α)(1 + i)] = (1− α) [−h(1 + i) +−w]
g =
(1− α) [−h(1 + i) + ws]
[1− (1− α)(1 + i)]
g =
(1− α) [h(1 + i)− ws]
[(1− α)(1 + i)− 1]
• An economy with high equilibrium wage for unskilled labor in period
t and f(wut ) > g is defined as a developed economy:
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1
i− r [wg(1 + r) + h(1 + i)− w
s] =
(1− α) [h(1 + i)− ws]
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1
wg(1 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws = (1− α) [h(1 + i)− w
s] (i− r)
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1
wg(1 + r) =
(1− α)h(1 + i)(i− r)− (1− α)ws(i− r)
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1 − h(1 + i) + w
s
wg(1 + r) =
h(1 + i) [(1− α)(i− r)− 1]− ws [(i− r)(1− α)− 1]
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1
wg(1 + r) =
[h(1 + i)− ws] [(1− α)(i− r)− 1]
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1
wg =
1
(1 + r)
[h(1 + i)− ws] (i− r − αi+ αr − 1)
(i− α− iα)
C. Calculations in the Li and Zou(1998) model:
• The solution of the first maximization problem:
max U i =
´∞
0
[
(ci)
1−θ−1
1−θ + ln g
]
e−ρtdt
s. t. dk
i
dt
= yi − ci = (1− τ)Aki − ci
the variation principle states that a reallocation of consumption be-
tween different periods does not improve overall utility. The solution
is called the Euler-Equation and has the general form:
dci
dt
ci
=
r − ρ
−U´´∗c
U´
i
In our case it implies the following:
dci
dt
ci
=
r − ρ
− θ(ci)−θ−1ci−(ci)−θ
=
r − ρ
θ
=
(1− τ)A− ρ
θ
From this equation it follows:
kit = k
i
0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
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cit = c
i
0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t =
ρ− (1− τ)(1− θ)A
θ
ki0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
σi0 =
ki0
k0
since everything grows at the same level and therefore the income share
of an individual is constant over time.
• The maximization problem for a government that maximizes individ-
ual i’s well-being with respect to τ :
max U i =
´∞
0
[
(ci)
1−θ−1
1−θ + ln g
]
e−ρtdt
s. t. kit = k
i
0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
cit =
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
ki0 ∗ e
(1−τi)A−ρ
θ
t
Plugging in the the constraints to the objective function we get:
U i =
´∞
0

(
ci0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)1−θ
− 1
1− θ + ln g
 e−ρtdt
=
∞ˆ
0
(
ci0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)1−θ
1− θ e
−ρtdt−
∞ˆ
0
1
1− θe
−ρtdt+
∞ˆ
0
ln g e−ρtdt
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– First part:
´∞
0
(
ci0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)1−θ
1−θ e
−ρtdt =
(ci0)
1−θ
1−θ
´∞
0
e
(1−θ)(1−τ)A−ρ(1−θ)−ρθ
θ
tdt =
(ci0)
1−θ
1−θ
θ
(1−θ)(1−τ)A−ρ(1−θ)−ρθ
(
e
(1−θ)(1−τ)A−ρ(1−θ)−ρθ
θ
t |∞0
)
=
(ci0)
1−θ
1−θ
θ
(1−θ)(1−τ)A−ρ (0− 1) =
1
1−θ
(
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
ki0
)1−θ
θ
−(1−θ)(1−τ)A+ρ =
1
1−θ
(
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)1−θ
(ki0)
1−θ (ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)−1
=
(ki0)
1−θ
1−θ
(
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)−θ
=
(k0σi)
1−θ
1−θ
(
ρ−(1−τ i)(1−θ)A
θ
)−θ
=
– Second part:
´∞
0
1
1−θe
−ρtdt =
1
1−θ
´∞
0
e−ρtdt =
1
1−θ
(
−1
ρ
)
(e−ρt |∞0 ) =
− 1
(1−θ)ρ (0− 1) =
1
(1−θ)ρ
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– Third part:
´∞
0
ln g e−ρtdt =´∞
0
ln (τAkit) e
−ρtdt =´∞
0
ln (τ) e−ρtdt+
´∞
0
ln (A) e−ρtdt+
´∞
0
ln (kit) e
−ρtdt =
ln (τ)
(
−1
ρ
)
(e−ρt |∞0 ) + ln (A)
(
−1
ρ
)
(e−ρt |∞0 ) +
´∞
0
ln (kit) e
−ρtdt =
ln (τ)
(
−1
ρ
)
(0− 1) + ln (A)
(
−1
ρ
)
(0− 1) + ´∞
0
ln (kit) e
−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
´∞
0
ln
(
ki0e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)
e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
´∞
0
ln (ki0) e
−ρtdt+
´∞
0
ln
(
e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)
e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+ ln (ki0)
(
−1
ρ
)
(e−ρt |∞0 ) +
´∞
0
ln
(
e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)
e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+
´∞
0
ln
(
e
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t
)
e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+
´∞
0
(1−τ)A−ρ
θ
t e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
´∞
0
t e−ρtdt =
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
[(
−1
ρ
e−ρtt |∞0
)
+
´∞
0
1
(
−1
ρ
)
e−ρtdt
]
=
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
[
0 +
(
−1
ρ
)(
−1
ρ
) ´∞
0
e−ρtdt
]
=
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
[
0 +
(
−1
ρ
)(
−1
ρ
)
(e−ρt |∞0 )
]
=
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
[
0 +
(
−1
ρ
)(
−1
ρ
)
(0− 1)
]
=
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
+ (1−τ)A−ρ
θ
[(
− 1
ρ2
)]
=
ln(τ)
ρ
+ ln(A)
ρ
+
ln(ki0)
ρ
− (1−τ)A−ρ
θρ2
As a result, we get:
U i =
(k0σ
i)
1−θ
1− θ
(
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ
− 1
(1− θ)ρ +
ln (τ i)
ρ
+
ln (A)
ρ
+
ln (ki0)
ρ
− (1− τ)A− ρ
θρ2
U i =
(σik0)
1−θ
1− θ
[
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
]−θ
− A(1− τi)− ρ
θρ2
+
ln τ i
ρ
+ const.
Now maximizing this utility function leads to the following FOC:
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−A (σik0)1−θ (ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−1
+
1
τ iρ
− A
θρ2
= 0
• Taking the total differential of this expression:(
∂f
∂τ i
)
dτ i +
(
∂f
∂σi
)
dσi = 0
(
∂f
∂τ i
)
= −A (σik0)1−θ (−θ − 1)(ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
(−(−1)(1− θ)A
θ
)
+ (−1) 1
(τ i)2ρ
= −A (σik0)1−θ (−θ − 1)(ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
(
(1− θ)A
θ
)
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
= −A2 (σik0)1−θ (−1) (θ + 1)(ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
(
(1− θ)
θ
)
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
= A2
(
σik0
)1−θ (θ − θ2 + 1− θ
θ
)(
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
−
1
(τ i)2ρ
= A2
(
σik0
)1−θ (1− θ2
θ
)(
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
(
∂f
∂σi
)
= −A (σik0)−θ (1− θ) k0(ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
⇒
(
A2
(
σik0
)1−θ (1− θ2
θ
)(
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2
− 1
(τ i)2ρ
)
dτ t =(
A
(
σik0
)−θ
(1− θ) k0
(
ρ− (1− τ i)(1− θ)A
θ
)−θ−2)
dσt
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D. Calculations in the García-Penalosa and
Turnovsky(2005) model:
• The consumers maximization problem:
max
´∞
0
1
β
(Cit(l
i)η)
ρ
e−β∗tdt
s.t. (1− s)dKi
dt
= (1− τK)rKi + (1− τW )(1− li)w − (1− τC)Ci
First we rewrite the problem as follows:
max
´∞
0
1
β
(Cit(l
i)η)
β
e−ρtdt
s.t. dK
i
dt
= (1−τK)rK
i
(1−s) +
(1−τW )(1−l)w
(1−s) − (1−τC)C
i
(1−s)
The solution to such a problem is the so called Euler equation and has
the form:
dci
dt
Ci
=
(1−τK)r
(1−s) − ρ
−U´´C
U´
i
The solution therefore looks as follows:
dci
dt
Ci
=
(1−τK)r
(1−s) − ρ
−U´´C
U´
i =
(1−τK)r
(1−s) − ρ
− (β−1)(Ci)β−2(li)ηβe−ρtC
(Ci)β−1(li)ηβe−ρt
i =
(1−τK)r
(1−s) − ρ
1− β
The three first order conditions are:
–
(Ci)β−1(li)ηβ = −(1 + τC)
(1− s) λ
i
–
η(Ci)β(li)ηβ−1 =
(1− τW )KαA(1− l)α−1
(1− s) λ
i
–
r
(
1− τK
1− s
)
= ρ− λ˙
i
λi
• Deriving the aggregated consumption-capital ratio from the first two
FOCs:
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(Ci)β−1(li)ηβ = (1+τC)
(1−s) λ
i and
η(Ci)β(li)ηβ−1 = (1−τW )KαA(1−l)
α−1
(1−s) λ
i
(Ci)β−1(li)ηβ = (1+τC)
(1−s) η(C
i)β(li)ηβ−1 (1−s)
(1−τW )KαA(1−l)α−1
(Ci)−1(li) = (1+τC)
(1−τW )αA(1−l)α−1K η
Ci
K
= (1−τW )αA(1−l)
α−1(li)
(1+τC)η
Ci
Ki
ki
= (1−τW )αA(1−l)
α−1(li)
(1+τC)η
Ci
Ki
= (1−τW )αA(1−l)
α−1(li)
(1+τC)ηki
⇒ C
K
=
(1−τW )
(1+τC )
αA(1−l)α−1l
η
• we can rewrite the individual capital accumulation as follows:
dKi
dt
=
(1− τK)rKi
(1− s) +
(1− τW )(1− li)w
(1− s) −
(1− τC)Ci
(1− s) (55)
Dividing both sides by Ki:
dKi
dt
Ki
=
(1− τK)r
(1− s) +
(1− τW )(1− li)αA(1− l)α−1K
(1− s)Ki −
(1− τC)Ci
(1− s)Ki
dKi
dt
Ki
=
(1− τK)r
(1− s) +
(1− τW )K
(1− s)Ki (1− li)αA(1− l)
α−1 −
(1− τC)
(1− s)
(
(1− τW )αA(1− l)α−1(li)
(1 + τC)ηki
)
(56)
dKi
dt
Ki
=
(1− τK)r
(1− s) +
(1− τW )K
(1− s)Ki αA(1− l)
α−1 (57)(
(1− li)− l
i
η
)
The first order conditions imply that η Ci
Ki
= (1−τW )
(1+τC)
αA(1− l)α−1li K
Ki
.
Aggregating implies that K = Ki and l = liand therefore we get
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dK
dt
K
=
(1− τK)r
(1− s) +
(1− τW )(1− li)αA(1− l)α−1
(1− s) −
(1− τC)
(1− s)
(1−τW )
(1+τC)
αA(1− l)α−1li
η
(58)
dK
dt
K
=
(1− τK)r
(1− s) + (59)
(1− τW )(1− li)αA(1− l)α−1
(1− s)
(
(1− l)− l
η
)
(60)
Combining (57) and (59) leads us to:
dki
dt
=
dK
i
K
dt
=
(1− τW )(1− li)αA(1− l)α−1
(1− s)
[(
1− li − l
i
η
)
−
(
1− l − l
η
)
kit
]
One can show that l, li are constant over time and the only long-run
stability solution is met when dki
dt
= 011.
Therefore we get:
dki
dt
=
(1− τW )(1− li)αA(1− l)α−1
(1− s)
[(
1− li − l
i
η
)
−
(
1− l − l
η
)
kit
]
= 0
⇒
(
1− li − l
i
η
)
=
(
1− l − l
η
)
∗ ki
We can rewrite this as:
η − ηli − li = (η − ηl − l)ki
−(1 + η)li + η = (−(1 + η)l + η) ki
−li + η
1 + η
=
(
−l + η
1 + η
)
ki
−li =
(
−l + η
1 + η
)
ki − η
1 + η
‖ ∗ (−1),−l
li − l =
(
l − η
1 + η
)
ki +
η
1 + η
− l
li − l =
(
l − η
1 + η
)(
ki − 1)
11 see: García-Penalosa, C., & Turnovsky, S. (2005). Growth, Income Inequality and
Fiscal Policy: What are the Relevant Tradeoffs? Working Paper Universités d’Aix-
Marseille
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• Deriving the goods market equilibrium:
dK
dt
= rK + wL− C
γ = r + αA(1− l)α−1K L
K
− C
K
γ = (1− α)A(1− l)α + αA(1− l)α − C
K
γ = A(1− l)α − C
K
• Deriving the relative individual income yi:
yi =
Y i
Y
=
rKi + w(1− li)
rK + w(1− l)
We know that:
w =
dY
dL
= αA(1− l)α−1K = ωK
r =
dY
dK
= (1− α) ∗ A ∗ (1− l)α = (1− α) ∗ Ω
and individual labor supply is:
li = l +
(
l − η
1 + η
)(
ki − 1)
Plugging in the individual labor supply and the factor prices we get:
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yi =
Y i
Y
=
rKi + w(1− li)
rK + w(1− l) =
rKi + ω(1− li)K
rK + ω(1− l)K
yi =
rKi + ωK(1− l −
(
l − η
1+η
)
(ki − 1))
rK + ωK(1− l)
yi =
Ki
(
r + ω K
Ki
(1− l) + ω K
Ki
(
l − η
1+η
)
∗ (1− ki))
)
rK + ωK(1− l)
yi = ki
(
r + ω K
Ki
(1− l) + ω K
Ki
(
l − η
1+η
)
(1− ki)
)
r + ω(1− l)
yi = ki
(
r + ω(1− l)− ω(1− l) + ω
ki
(1− l) + ω
ki
(
l − η
1+η
)
(1− ki)
)
r + ω(1− l)
yi = ki ∗
1 +
(
(1− l)( ω
ki
− ω) + ω
ki
(
l − η
1+η
)
(1− ki)
)
r + ω(1− l)

yi = ki
1 +
(
ω(1− l)
(
1−ki
ki
)
+ ω
ki
(
l − η
1+η
)
(1− ki)
)
r + ω(1− l)

yi = ki
1 + ωki (1− ki)
(
1− l + l − η
1+η
)
r + ω(1− l)

yi = ki
1 + ωki (1− ki)
(
1
1+η
)
r + ω(1− l)

yi = ki
1 + ωki (1− ki)
(
1
1+η
)
(1− α)Ω + αA(1− l)α−1(1− l)

yi = ki +
ω(1− ki)
(
1
1+η
)
(1− α)A(1− l)α + αA(1− l)α
yi = ki +
ω(1− ki)
A(1− l)α(1 + η) = k
i +
αA(1− l)α−1(1− ki)
A(1− l)α(1 + η)
yi = ki +
α(1− ki)
(1 + η)(1− l)
⇒ yi − 1 = (ki − 1) + α(1− k
i)
(1 + η)(1− l) = (k
i − 1)
(
1− α
(1 + η)(1− l)
)
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Supplement
A. Zusammenfassung
Ziel dieser Magisterarbeit ist es, den Zusammenhang zwischen Einkom-
mensungleichheit und Wirtschaftswachstum darzulegen. Zuerst werden die
neueste empirische Literatur und deren Ergebnisse präsentiert. Schnell wird
klar, dass die Einkommensverteilung in komplexem Zusammenhang mit dem
Wirtschaftswachstum steht. Unterschiedlich empirische Methoden führen zu
unterschiedlichen Resultaten. Während die empirische Literatur versucht,
diese Zusammenhänge intuitiv zu erörtern, werden in der Folge theoretische
Modelle präsentiert, die versuchen, die empirischen Studien zu bestätigen.
Dabei werden zwei Gruppen von Modellen in der Arbeit vorgestellt: Der
„Political Economy Approach“ und der „Capital Market Imperfection Ap-
proach“.
Zu jedem Ansatz wird ein Modell im Detail diskutiert. Auch hier sind
die Ergebnisse kontrovers. Das PE-Modell von Alesina und Rodrick (1994)
zeigt, dass - wenn die Ungleichheit in der Einkommensverteilung hoch ist -
die Politik eine Steuer wählt, die die Wachstumsrate einer Wirtschaft ver-
ringert. Daher besteht ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen der Ungleich-
heit in der Einkommensverteilung und dem Wirtschaftswachstum. Li and
Zou (1998) zeigen, dass unter leicht geänderten Annahmen in diesem Modell
die Relation auch positiv sein kann. Das CMI-Modell von Galor und Zeira
(1993) zeigt, dass Ungleichheit zu einer Unterinvestition in Humankapital
führt und daher ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen Einkommensungle-
ichheit und Wirtschaftswachstum besteht.
Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, die Relation zwischen Einkommen-
sungleichheit und Wirtschaftswachstum von zwei Faktoren abhängt: Er-
stens, vom Faktor Zeit und, zweitens, vom Entwicklungszustand eines Lan-
des. Langfristig scheint es, dass höhere Ungleichheit zu einem niedrigeren
Wachstum führt. Kurzfristig jedoch kann der Zusammenhang positiv sein.
In Entwicklungsländern hat höhere Einkommensungleichheit einen posi-
tiven Effekt auf das Wirtschaftswachstum. Im weiteren Verlauf der Entwick-
lung, sobald Humankapital zur treibenden Wachstumskraft wird, ändert sich
jedoch dieser Zusammenhang. In späteren Stadien, wenn der Kapitalmarkt
nicht mehr beschränkend wirkt, sollte der Zusammenhang dann insignifikant
werden.
Diese zwei Faktoren sind auch entscheidend für wirtschaftspolitische Schluß-
folgerungen. Umverteilung von Einkommen verschlechtert immer die An-
reizstruktur in einer Wirtschaft. Aber es gibt wirtschaftspolitische Maßnah-
men, die erstens die Einkommensungleichheit verringern und zweitens das
Wachstum einer Wirtschaft fördern.
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